The effect of outward migration on election outcomes in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania after accession to the European Union by Wright, Helen Winifred Kristina
 UNIVERSITY OF TARTU 
Faculty of Social Sciences 
 Johan Skytte Institute of Political Studies  
 
Helen Winifred Kristina Wright  
 
Masters Thesis 
 
 
The effect of outward migration on election outcomes in Estonia, 
Latvia, and Lithuania after accession to the European Union  
 
 
Supervisor:  
Mihkel Solvak, PhD 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Tartu 2019 
 
  
 
 
AUTHOR’S DECLARATION 
 
I, Helen Winifred Kristina Wright, have written this Master's thesis independently. All            
viewpoints of other authors, literary sources and data from elsewhere used for writing             
this paper have been referenced. 
  
......................................................................... 
/ signature of author / 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
The defence will take place on .......................................... ​/ date / at ......................... ​/             
time / 
................................................... ​/ address / in auditorium number ...................... ​/         
number / 
  
Opponent ................................................... ​/ name /​ (................ ​/ academic degree /​), 
.................................. ​/ position / 
 
 
  
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Since 2004, hundreds of thousands of people have emigrated from Estonia, Latvia,             
and Lithuania to work and live abroad in other European Union member states. Once              
outside of their countries these citizens - like the majority of emigrants around the world               
- stop taking part in home elections. This thesis examines what could have happened if               
these voters had stayed in their home countries and continued to vote. Would election              
outcomes have changed if these people had participated in them? I look specifically at              
one election from each country, all of which took place between 2014 and 2016, and               
their outcomes. My time frame for emigration from Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania            
started in 2004 after all three countries joined the European Union, and ended the year               
of, or year before, the election I have chosen to study. Using an impact assessment and                
counterfact model, I calculated my results using data from each country’s national            
statistics office and the European Social Survey. My results show that election            
outcomes in Estonia and Lithuania would have remained broadly the same, but in             
Latvia the political party which received the highest vote share would have changed. In              
Estonia and Latvia, the centre-right parties would have been strengthened with these            
extra votes, in Lithuania centre-left parties would gained more support than they did in              
the real election. This thesis adds to the narrow genre of literature that already exists               
and looks at the impact of emigration on politics and elections in home countries. It is                
the first, to my knowledge, that looks specifically at election outcomes in the Baltic              
states or any of three countries.  
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INTRODUCTION  
 
​Around the world, in the last three decades, external voting has “boomed”             
(Lafleur, 2011) as governments have extended the right to vote to their citizens who live               
beyond their home countries borders. But there has been a downside to this extension of               
democratic rights - turnout data shows that emigrants do not vote. “There has been a               
noteworthy gap between the policy aims …. and the policy outcomes, characterised by             
low turnout and marginal electoral impact” ​say ​Hutcheson and Arrighi ​(2015​)​. ​Research            
suggests high-levels of emigration have impact on sending countries’ labour markets,           
demographics, and political institutions. But what happens to a sending country’s           
elections when a large amount of emigrants stop voting? Does this voluntary            
disenfranchisement have an impact on a country? This what this thesis seeks to find out.  
  
In 2004, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania joined the European Union alongside five             
other countries - the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia - which,             
collectively, became known as the EU8. As well as gaining places at the decision              
making tables in Brussels and Strasbourg, their citizens gained the right to freedom of              
movement to live and work throughout the European Union. In the Baltics, unlike in              
Poland, access to freedom of movement did not have an immediate effect and             
pre-accession levels of outward migration increased by only around 1,000 each year, in             
each country (Hazans and Phillips, 2011). But the impacts that followed the global             
financial crash in 2008 hit these three countries hard. As their economies stalled and              
shrank, tens of thousands of people began to use their new found rights to leave and find                 
better opportunities elsewhere. But when these economies started to grow again,           
emigration rates continued to rise instead of fall. Latvia and Lithuania still have high              
levels of emigration and in 2017 more than 50,000 people left Lithuania (BNS/             
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Lithuania Tribune, 2018). In the same year, Estonia recorded positive net migration for             
the third year in a row (a gain of 3,070 people or 0.2%), but 12,358 people emigrated                 
(Statistics Estonia, 2018; Tammur, Tammaru and Puur, 2017).  
 
Today, in 2019, more than 10% of the workforce of Latvia and Lithuania, and at                
least 6% of Estonians, live outside of their home countries. These are estimates at best               
because accurate migration data is hard to obtain, and some organisations say these             
figures are too low. But whatever the exact number, this is several times higher than the                
average number of EU citizens living outside of their countries, which is between 2-3%              
(Golubeva et al, 2016). When people emigrate, their participation in elections decreases            
and many people become disengaged from their home country and its subsequent            
elections. Data shows that a maximum of 10% of Latvian emigrants - around 23,053              
voters, an increase of more than 8,000 from the previous election - (Latvian Ministry of               
Foreign Affairs, 2014) and Lithuanian emigrants (Ramonaitė, 2009) participated in          
recent elections. The figure is lower for Estonians, who also have the ability to easily               
cast their votes online instead of only by post or at an embassy, unlike Latvians or                
Lithuanians (Oll, 2015). For the 2015 election 11,273 votes from abroad were submitted             
or 2% of total votes (Solvak & Vassil, 2016).  
 
But why does voter abstention and non-participation behaviour matter to these three             
countries? It matters because the governments of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania believe            
that the best way to stall demographic decline in each country is to get emigrants to                
return. But if these emigrants do not feel connected to their homeland, or if governments               
who do not stand for their values are in power, are they still likely to return? By                 
emigrants not voting in home country elections, specific policies and parties can            
become stronger due to the rapid and non-random change in voter composition which is              
taking place as these emigrants withdraw from the democratic process. For example, if             
fewer young people vote - as younger people are more likely to emigrate - parties may                
create policies directed at older people who do vote, and ignore the views of younger               
people. As a result, it is possible that society has moved in a different direction than it                 
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would have otherwise done had these people not emigrated and continued to vote.             
Different parties could have received the majority vote share in elections or enacted             
different policies without support from others. So, if this is the case, if society has               
moved too far away from a place these young emigrants want to live, will they return                
permanently again? 
 
This ​aim o​f this thesis ​is to examine the effect of outward migration from Estonia,                
Latvia, and Lithuania on election outcomes after the three countries joined the European             
Union in 2004. It focuses on how outward migration altered the demographics of each              
country, and how this has changed the composition of eligible voters. It examines if this               
change in voter demographics has had any effect on election outcomes, and, if so,              
determines what those changes could have been. It seeks to find out which, if any,               
political parties have gained or weakened in strength since 2004 due to the change in               
voter composition. The elections selected for study are three recent national elections            
which took place in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania from 2014 to 2016. The most recent               
for Estonia (2015) and Lithuania (2016), but not for Latvia (2014) as the 2018 election               
took place while this thesis was being written. My ​research questions​ are as followed:  
 
1. How have voting demographics changed in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania since 
2004? 
2. What political forces have been strengthened as a result of outward migration?  
  
Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania were selected for study because they all joined the              
European Union at the same time in 2004 and so each country’s migration patterns              
share some common characteristics with the other two. A second reason is that each              
country has a higher proportion of emigrants living outside of their home country than              
average. Thirdly, compared to emigrants from central European countries who joined           
the European Union at the same time, Baltic migrants have been shown to be more               
mobile since accession (Hazans and Philips, 2011; Golubeva et al, 2016).  
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​The ​methodology used in this thesis will be an impact assessment and             
counterfactual analysis which will test what the impact of a large non-random section of              
society not participating in elections is. Non-random is defined as people who share the              
same socio-demographic characteristics, such as age, gender, or education level. A           
random section of society would be a representative sample of the population which             
would then see similar results across all areas of society rather than in just one, or                
several, specific areas. Demographic characteristics - such as age, gender, employment,           
and marital status - have been shown to affect the way people participate in elections, so                
when a large non-random group of people withdraw from the electoral process this             
should have effects on the outcome of elections. This is because there have been              
changes to the overall voting population which should, at least potentially, create an             
impact on the elections’ results.   
   
To calculate these results quantitative emigration data from statistics agencies in            
Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania have been used to create an impact assessment using a              
counterfactual model. This model measures the estimated impact of outward migration           
on elections in each country. To create the model a series of demographic profiles of               
these emigrants based on their ​age and gender ​- factors shown to influence voting                
behaviour and characteristics collected by statistics agencies - have been made. These            
profiles were then matched against similar people who stayed in their home countries             
and voted in elections. The total number of emigrants over the age of 18 were added to                 
each demographic of home country voters and assumed that they would have voted in              
the same way had they not emigrated. ​The results of this method shows the likely effect                
of outward migration on election outcomes based on empirical evidence and what            
effects are felt when a large non-random section of the electorate stop voting. These              
results indicate the possible policy differences but this will not be the main outcome of               
this thesis. The results have not be used to further speculate on the impact of different                
policies that could have been introduced if the hypothetical scenario shown in the             
impact assessment had actually happened, or claim that they would have been            
introduced instead of policies that were.  
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There are several ​limitations to using this approach because a counterfactual can             
only ever be regarded as an estimate of what might have happened, and the data I have                 
selected to use is nowhere near ideal. However, this an issue with the collection of               
migration and emigration data as a whole which I alluded to above, rather than just the                
data I have chosen to use. These limitations are thoroughly explained and expanded             
upon in section three.  
 
Migration and emigration have a high degree of visibility and saliency in domestic              
media and are regularly discussed by politicians in the Baltic states. From time-to-time             
the issue of emigration, particularly from Latvia and Lithuania where the population            
decline has been steepest, is also written about by the international media. In countries              
which receive high levels of immigration - such as the UK, Germany, Finland, Sweden,              
and Ireland - the media shows an interest in what has happened to the countries that                
their new migrant populations have left, with varying degrees of accuracy. But these             
reports mostly focus on the labour market rather than the effect on these countries’              
politics. Governments from all three Baltic countries have publicly launched campaigns           
to attract migrants back home, especially Latvia (LSM, 2018) although none to date             
have been particularly successful. These efforts have also been criticized by the            
domestic media in each country for not attracting people to return. Annual migration             
figures are reported by the media in each country when published, provoking wider             
debate. During Lithuania’s 2016 national elections the outsider party, now known as the             
Greens and Farmers Union which went on to win the biggest vote share, put bringing               
back young emigrants at the centre of its manifesto (BBC, 2016). Lithuania will also              
hold a referendum on dual citizenship in 2019 in tandem with the presidential election              
(LETA/ The Baltic Times, 2018), and one of the motivating factors for this is because               
the government is worried that after the United Kingdom leaves the European Union,             
many Lithuanians will trade their citizenships for a British passport, and will then never              
permanently return (AFP /Euractiv, 2017). In 2018, Latvia started a year-long pilot            
project to encourage families to return to the country, which at the time of writing, has                
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seen 130 families (or 330 people) move to Latvia (LSM 2018; Baltic Course, 2018). In               
December 2018, the chairman of the Reform Party, Kaja Kallas, said in an interview              
that Estonian needs to become more attractive to its emigrants to encourage them to              
return (Cavegn, 2018). These recent examples, and the other reasons laid out above,             
combine to show that the issue of emigration and its impact have a high degree of                
saliency among public debate in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania is, therefore, a relevant             
topic for further research.  
  
The structure of this thesis will be divided into seven chapters. The ​first chapter               
will summarise the literature relating to turnout demographics, voting behaviour, and           
the the effect of emigration on election outcomes. The ​second will layout recent             
migration trends in the Baltic states since 2004. The ​third will outline the methods,              
data, and limitations. An explanation of how I calculated my results and made my              
migrant profiles is the focus of the ​fourth chapter, the ​fifth will show the results of                
these calculations. The ​sixth chapter will be a discussion about this thesis and answer              
the my research questions, finally, the ​seventh​ will conclude this thesis.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW  
  
This thesis will review several genres of literature. ​The first section looks at               
external voting, the second will focus on the effect of demographics on voting             
behaviour, thirdly literature concerning voting behaviour will be discussed, and finally           
the effect of emigration on sending countries. The research which justifies my variable             
selection will also be discussed.  
 
(1.1) External Voting 
  
 
External voting, although known by several different names, such as an absentee             
ballot, ​is the act of a citizen voting in a home country election from abroad. It is a                  
relatively new phenomenon and was only expanded to the majority of citizens in             
applicable countries after the Second World War (​Ellis, 2007) and there has been “sharp              
increase” (​Hutcheson and Arrighi, 2015​) globally in the last three decades. Previously it             
was mainly reserved for military forces stationed outside of their home countries. But as              
the world becomes more interconnected, and increasing numbers of people travel for            
business and pleasure, or emigrate either temporarily or permanently, external voting is            
increasing in saliency (​Ellis, 2007​). Today, more than 190 countries allow their citizens             
to vote from abroad, and only two European Union countries (Ireland and Greece) deny              
their citizens the right to vote when they leave the country. Considering how widespread              
the practice is, and that there is no rule stipulating that people who leave their home                
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country must continue to have voting rights, this is fairly remarkable (Lafleur 2015).             
How​ever, as there is no international standard, many countries do limit their citizens             
access to voting in some way. Examples include being allowed to vote in local or               
presidential elections but not national, or having to vote in specific locations such as              
embassies, or well in advance of the actual election day. Some countries, such as              
Denmark and the United Kingdom, restrict voting rights if a person has left the country               
for more than a certain number of years. Some of the processes can be complicated and                
time consuming, such as having to apply for special identification beforehand.           
Hartmann (​2015​) argues that migration patterns, remittances, domestic institutional         
structures, and partisan politics, play a role in whether external voting are introduced by              
a country, and finds evidence from countries in sub-Saharan Africa supporting his            
claims.  
 
External voting is seen as a symbolically significant way to keep citizens engaged              
with their home country while they do not live there (​Collyer and Vahti, 2007​).              
Especially if it is hoped these citizens will one day permanently return home. It can also                
be seen as a way for emigrants to express their national identity, patriotism, and sense of                
belonging (​Boccagni and Ramirez, 2013​). ​Expatriate voting is more likely to occur in             
places with a higher concentration of migrants, and there is an increased likelihood of              
participation in home country elections in countries which rely on remittances to boost             
their economies (Collyer and Vahti, 2007​). However, high levels of emigration could            
also impede the introduction of external voting if migrants are not relied on for              
remittances or are more likely to belong to a specific ethnic group (Hartmann, 2015​). If               
emigrants are denied voting rights while they live abroad it can been seen as denying               
them their full citizenship rights ​(Collyer and Vahti, 2007​). Governments have also            
sought to limit voting from abroad in case it “unexpectedly” (​Hutcheson and Arrighi             
2015​) affect election outcomes. Emigration has long been thought of as a safety valve              
(Pearlman, 2013) ​through which troublemakers or dissidents are encouraged to leave the            
workforce, state, or nation. If a large part of the diaspora have negative feelings towards               
the government then limiting their right to take part in home country elections is              
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beneficial to the party that wants to remain in power. But the arguments against              
introducing external voting focus on whether votes from citizens living abroad should            
hold the same weight as citizens who live inside the country and whether they should               
have the same amount of representation ​(Hutcheson and Arrighi, 2015​). For countries            
that want there emigrants to return, such as Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, I’d argue              
they must be seen on the same footing. Research has shown that emigrants voting in               
home country elections can affect the outcomes of elections. In ​Moldova​, emigrants            
who moved to the west were more likely to, and also encourage family members to,               
vote for non-communist and pro-EU candidates in national elections in the ​2009            
election (​Mahmoud et al, 2013​). The opposite occurred in areas where the majority of              
migrants went to work in Russia. The authors argued that values transmitted from host              
countries helped to overthrow the communist government. Currently, in 2019, there is            
an ongoing debate in Ireland ​as to whether the several million strong diaspora should be               
given the right to vote in presidential elections. Critics fear emigrants, or people who              
have never even lived in the country, will strongly influence the vote in a negative way                
(​Erben et al, 2017 ​). Granting external voting rights can also be seen partly as              
restorative justice to communities who have been excluded from their homelands when            
regimes change or fall ​(Pogonyi, 2014).   
 
(1.2) Voting behaviour and Turnout 
 
There is a lot of literature which deals with the subject of voting behaviour: why                
people do or do not vote, what influences their likelihood of voting, and who they vote                
for. Some characteristics or factors are well known to influence a person’s likelihood of              
voting, such as age, gender, education, marital status and income (Smets and Van Ham,              
2013). Others, are known to decrease the likelihood of voting, such as a youth, cost,               
distance to polling station, and complexity of registration (Smets and Van Ham, 2013).             
But to date there is no one set of variables that fit into any theoretical model that has                  
been constructed (Geys, 2006). Voting theories suggest that voters act rationally           
(Downs, 1957) in the knowledge that their vote matters and to bring change. However,              
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if people believe their votes will not make a difference then they will not participate               
(Geys, 2006). But social pressure from others - such as society, their workplace, or              
partner - have been shown to increase a voter’s likelihood of participation (Smets and              
van Ham 2013) A sense of civic duty has also been shown to make people participate in                 
elections (Smets and van Ham 2013) ​Other factors such as population size (Owen and              
Grofman, 1984) have been thought to have a significant impact on turnout level. The              
argument being the larger the population, the larger the likelihood of absenteeism            
because voters may believe that their single vote will make no difference to the              
outcome. Geys (2006) tested 28 aggregate level data estimation studies for turnout or             
absenteeism and found there to be a significant negative relationship between           
population size and turnout. Population stability - which is sometimes defined by a             
variable such as mobility or home ownership - was found to be an important              
determinant to turnout. In the context of emigration this seems likely to influence             
turnout, because most emigrants are young and unlikely to own property either in their              
home or destination country, weakening their ties to a specific area or political             
association. Population concentration - mostly used to argue that cities are more            
individualistic than rural areas and therefore voting is less likely due to weaker social              
bonds - was found to have no influence on turnout. This is interesting in relation to my                 
thesis because many emigrants move from rural areas to bigger cities, or even from              
small cities, such as Tallinn or Riga, to bigger cities abroad.  
 
Two of the variables I am going to use for my counterfactual are ​gender ​and ​age​,                 
and these both have an effect on electoral behaviour and turnout. Gender is, in most               
cases, “no longer a statistically significantly predictor of turnout in national elections”            
according to Smets and Van Ham (2013), although, when it is, there is some evidence               
that women turnout at higher rates than men. While men and women do tend to vote in                 
roughly equal numbers there is a difference or “gender gap” (Giger, 2009) when it              
comes to each gender’s behaviour (Abendschön and Steinmetz, 2014). Giger (2009)           
defines this as “the distance between the voting choices of men and women”. Since the               
1980s in many western democracies women tend to vote for more left wing candidates,              
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but before then they voted for centre-right and conservative parties at a greater rate than               
men did (Abendschön and Steinmetz, 2014; Giger, 2009; ​Box-Steffensmeier, De Boef,           
and Lin 2004). Abendschön and Steinmetz (2014) argue this is because women are             
more likely to be found in “precarious” employment, and will support candidates with             
strong welfare policies. Evidence has been found to support this argument in western             
Europe (Giger 2009) and the USA (Box-Steffensmeier, De Boef, and Lin 2004) where             
there are high levels of women in the workforce. Giger also argues this development is               
down to “societal modernization” (2009). Abendschön and Steinmetz (2014) found that           
there is a gender voting gap in 25 European Union countries, but they differ for each                
country. Their research also showed that women in post-communist countries are more            
likely to vote for parties on the right. They suggest this could be because in these                
countries left-wing parties do not act like left-wing parties in western democracies. This             
is clearly a relevant finding in relation to my research.  
  
Turning to age, Smets and Van Ham (2013), who reviewed and tested 90              
empirical studies of individual level voter turnout, say that “young adults are notorious             
abstainers” and that turnout increases with age, before tailing off when people reach old              
age. Their research shows that age is a positive indicator of voting in most of the papers                 
they review. Evidence is split on whether the voting age should be lowered to 16 or not,                 
but Wagner, Johann, and Kritzinger (2012) finds little evidence to suggest that 16 and              
17 year olds are less able or less motivated than 18 year olds to participate in politics.  
 
Regarding turnout, one of the main arguments of this thesis is that had more people                
voted, the results of each election could have been different. Of the research focusing on               
this subject, the results are mixed. If non-voters differ from voters, as some US              
elections-focused research suggests (Highton and Wolfinger, 2001), then elections with          
an increased turnout could have changed the outcomes of elections because different            
types of people, for example more minorities, would have voted for the non-winning             
candidate. However, unless electoral races are very close increased turnout may make            
no difference (Citrin, Schickler and Sides, 2003; ​2008; H​ighton and Wolfinger 2001).            
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But in Australia, the introduction of compulsory voting was found to have increased             
turnout by 24%, increased working class participation, and affected public policy           
especially regarding spending on pensions (Fowler 2013). However, this is a case            
without many comparisons as few countries have compulsory voting.    
 
(1.3) Voting Abroad Characteristics 
  
External voting typically does not yield a high turnout rate which can be explained               
by a number of potential factors. Physical barriers to casting a vote include difficulty              
accessing polling stations, complexity of registration process, cost, or distance needed to            
travel to cast a ballot. These reasons have been shown to have a negative effect on voter                 
turnout in home countries and therefore could explain why emigrants turnout in such             
low numbers when they live abroad. A lack of interest in home country affairs and               
politics, or dissatisfaction with the parties on offer, could also be a big reason for low                
turnout figures among emigrants. However, Lafleur and Chelius (2011), say migrants           
lack of interest and bureaucratic barriers to voting are not sufficient enough variables to              
completely explain low turnout amongst emigrants. Lafleur also ​argues, w​e do not know             
if low turnout of emigrants is caused by “​classical indicators of voting behaviour”             
(L​afleur 2015), such as civic duty, and if these actually affect people voting from abroad               
as very little research has been carried out on this subject. However, there is a growing                
body of research that suggests new variables to measure turnout in diaspora            
communities and external voting, some of which are similar to classical indicators.            
Depth of integration of migrants in their host country has been shown to have an effect                
on transnational electoral engagement among the Polish diaspora in the UK who took             
part in the 2010 presidential election (Ahmadov and Sasse, 2016). More integration is             
linked to less home country engagement, and shown to have no effect on abstention.              
The same study suggested that older voters are more engaged with home country             
politics, potentially because they have more time and resources to set aside for political              
participation in comparison to young people and families. This is obviously similar to             
home country demographics. However, this could also be linked to migration age. If a              
 
 
12 
 
 
 
person migrates in their 60s or 70s they may have a stronger connection to their               
homeland than a young person in their 20s or 30s does. Or, it could be linked to the                  
language level they have obtained of the host country language and which country’s             
media they follow. Likelihood of voting is influenced by destination country (Ahmadov            
and Sasse, 2016; ​Lafleur & Sanchez-Dominguez, 2015), reasons for emigrating          
(Ahmadov and Sasse, 2016; ​Mahmoud, et al, 2013), whether the voter has migrated             
from an urban or rural area (Guarnizo, Portes, & Haller 2003; ​Lafleur &             
Sanchez-Dominguez, 2015, Ahmadov and Sasse, 2016​) ​and length of stay (Ahmadov           
and Sasse, 2016). In south America, married male migrants have been found to be more               
engaged with home country politics (Guarnizo, Portes, and Haller 2003; Jones-Correa           
1998). ​Higher education also been shown to positively influence political engagement           
of emigrants (​Guarnizo, Portes, & Haller 2003​) although Ahmadov and Sasse (​2016​)            
found this was not an influencing factor in their research. Occupation, such as having a               
white- or blue-collar job, has been shown to have a positive effect on political              
engagement in a home country (​Ahmadov and Sasse 2016; ​Guarnizo, Portes, & Haller             
2003​). Much of this research has been carried out on emigrant communities from south              
America and Mexico, and less so on Europeans. But, ​diaspora networks are shown to              
strongly influence political engagement in some communities, such as Ukrainians ​but           
not others, such as Poles (Ahmadov and Sasse, 2016). We also do not know much about                
why people participate in external voting. But, what we do know, is that when citizens               
emigrate the majority stop actively participating in electoral activities in their home            
countries, and evidence for this is supported by low turnout rates of voters living outside               
of their home countries 
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(1. 4) Effect of Emigration on Elections in Sending Countries 
  
As the literature above shows demographics, distance, ease of access, and cost             
(Dyck and Gimpel, 2005) matter when it comes to voting - and this, surely, is especially                
so when it comes to voting from outside of a home country. But this leaves the question                 
of how, or if, emigration affects home country elections unanswered. It should be             
pointed out that there is only a small body of literature on this subject, with most                
researchers arguing it is an understudied area. The foremost cited reason for this is that               
emigration and migration data are hard to accurately source because emigrants are not             
surveyed and deregistering from a home country is usually optional. But several            
researchers have looked at the impact of emigration on election outcomes and also             
political development (how political institutions have been affected). Hirschman (1970,          
1978) theorized that emigration played a role in democratisation, and there is now             
evidence that high levels of outward migration can speed up or slow down political              
change depending on the country (Anelli & Peri, 2016; ​Moses, 2005; Pfutze, 2012;             
Pearlman, 2013). It can strengthen the power that workers who stay behind have over              
employers (Karadja & Prawitz, 2016) and encourage elites to liberalise institutions to            
retain workers (Landgrave and Nowrasteh, 2016). It can, and has, lead to the formation              
of workers unions and new political parties (Karadja & Prawitz, 2016; ​Moses 2011).             
Emigration can also change institutions because it “decreases the cost of dissent” as the              
dissenter can leave (Landgrave and Nowrasteh, 2016). However, research also shows           
that emigration can cause home country politics to stagnate and suppress political            
change, such as in Lebanon where up to 20% of the population lives abroad (Pearlman,               
2013). It can also strip society of people pushing for change (Moses 2011) and              
Hirschman (1978) argued that outward migration reduces the likelihood of voting by            
offering the option of an exit. Pearlman echoes this line of thought, stating “the dream               
of leaving lessens the imperative of working to relieve that misery” (2013). This way of               
thinking, she says, can also affect people who haven’t even emigrated yet if they believe               
they will in the near future enabling “political apathy” ​(2013​) and reducing the             
“perceived need for political change” (2013). Research from Mexico and Lebanon show            
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that families receiving financial remittances also do not need to seek money from the              
government and can therefore afford to ignore the domestic political situation as they             
are provided for in other ways by other people (Adida and Girod, 2011; Pearlman,              
2013). Pearlman quotes a Lebanese interviewee as saying: “money from abroad gives            
people the luxury of complaining about politics without doing much” (2013). However,            
Pfutze ​(2012) ​found that municipalities with a high level of emigrant households in             
Mexico were more likely to vote for opposition parties if they were not already in               
power, concluding that international migration is influential in the process of           
democratisation. Even in the “overwhelming majority” ​(​Hutcheson and Arrighi 2015​) ​of           
cases where emigrants do vote from abroad it has “failed” to “significantly” ​(​Hutcheson             
and Arrighi 2015​) alter expected election outcomes ​. European exceptions to this are            
Italy’s 2006 election and Romania in 2009, where voters from abroad voted heavily for              
opposition parties ​(​Hutcheson and Arrighi 2015). Destination country has been found to            
have a positive impact on home countries (Batista and Vicente, 2011; Pfutze, 2012;             
Chauvet and Mercier, 2014) but Lodigiani argues this is only true as long as the host                
country allows emigrants to integrate (Lodigiani, 2016). Values can be transferred from            
democratic or autocratic host countries to sending countries via emigrators, influencing           
election outcomes (Mahmoud et al, 2013; ​Pfutze, 2012). Political institutions can also            
be positively improved by emigration to democratic countries through the “transfer of            
new ideas and political norms, return or circular migration, and remittances” (Lodigiani,            
2016). But emigration to non-democratic countries can also bring about negative effects            
in home countries too (Lodigiani, 2016; ​Mahmoud et al, 2013). There is a lack of               
research that tries to determine what exact amount of emigrants need to have left in               
order to bring about institutional change (Landgrave and Nowrasteh, 2016)​. In           
Moldova, emigration paths to Europe and Russia influenced if votes were cast for the              
communist party or not in the 2010 elections (Mahmoud et al, 2013). In Italy, votes for                
the Five Star Movement (Anelli and Peri, 2016) increased in areas of high migration              
and decreased the chance of a female politicians being elected in several areas of the               
country. In areas of high youth emigration there was an increased likelihood of regional              
governments collapsing after corruption claims were made against them. These two           
 
 
15 
 
 
 
studies are particularly relevant to my research as they use counterfactual methods to             
determine their results, and both use models to calculate that if more people had voted a                
different outcome could have been achieved backing up my claim that emigration does             
have an effect on election outcomes. This argument is also supported by Pfutze’s work              
in Mexico (2012), although his findings were not determined with a counterfactual            
model. Emigration can also lower turnout (Kostelka 2017) and is thought to have done              
so in the countries that joined the European Union in 2004, as well as Bulgaria and                
Romania which joined later. Kostelka (2017), using a counterfactual model, estimated           
the likelihood of turnout in these 10 countries had high levels of emigration not              
occurred. He calculated that voting turnout had been negatively influenced. His study is             
obviously relevant to this thesis, not just because the results were determined using a              
counterfactual, but because it is the first work to look at the influence of emigration on                
elections in the Baltic states. 
 
(1.5) What will my research add?  
 
 
What we can see from the studies discussed above is that there is limited research                
on both emigrants voting from abroad, and the effect that their lack of participation may               
have on home country election outcomes. As far as I am aware, no one has attempted to                 
study this in Estonia, Latvia, or Lithuania. Therefore, this research is the first attempt to               
address this subject and would add to the small amount of literature already available. It               
will ​show examples of when a specific voter segment is removed and how society could               
take a slightly different direction as a result. Secondly, generally, if researchers have             
studied emigration or external voting they have focused on one country, such as Italy,              
Ecuador, Mexico, or Moldova. They have usually studied both national and regional            
elections, whereas I will only be studying national elections. Others have also not             
attempted to compare results from different countries, or in a geographical region. This             
is something I do in this thesis by comparing data from Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.               
They are valid countries for comparison because their populations are small, each            
country has seen a high level of migration, and the starting points - 2004 and 2007 - for                  
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this most recent emigration waves are the same in all three countries. Thirdly, there is               
also a lack of research, published in English at least, of how migration from the Baltic                
states, or other countries which joined the European Union in 2004, has affected home              
countries populations when not solely related to the labour market. Plenty of studies             
centre on remittances and the labour market, but research on the social effects and how               
these affect society and politics are less well researched. Instead, much of the literature              
looks at the impact of migration from EU8 countries on host countries in western              
Europe, including how migration impacts on voting intentions and the outcomes of            
elections on the native populations.  
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CHAPTER TWO  
 
EMIGRATION FROM ESTONIA, LATVIA, AND 
LITHUANIA, SINCE 2004  
  
 
(2.1) Definitions of Migrant and Emigrant 
 
I will follow the European Commission's migration glossary for a definition of             
what a migrant or emigrant is because most European countries have differing            
definitions and the length of time spent abroad to qualify as one. Regarding, Latvia,              
Lithuania, and Estonia, the definitions vary slightly (United Nations 2015) from country            
to country, but all, specify a migrant is someone who lives outside of their country for at                 
least one year. The European Commission also uses this length of time, so this is the                
definition of migrant, which I am also using interchangeably to mean emigrant, that I              
will use.  
 
The full definition of ‘migrant’ as defined by the European Commission is             
reproduced in full below:  
 
In the ​global context , a person who is outside the territory of the State of which they are                   
nationals or citizens and who has resided in a foreign country for more than one year                
irrespective of the causes, voluntary or involuntary, and the means, regular or irregular,             
used to migrate. 
In the ​EU/EFTA context , a person who either: (i) establishes their usual residence in the                
territory of an EU/EFTA Member State for a period that is, or is expected to be, of at                  
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least 12 months, having previously been usually resident in another EU/EFTA Member            
State or a third country ; or (ii) having previously been usually resident in the territory                
of the EU/EFTA Member State, ceases to have their usual residence in the EU/EFTA              
Member State for a period that is, or is expected to be, of at least 12 months. 
 
(2.2) Freedom of Movement and EU Migration 
  
Freedom of goods, capital, services, and labour are the four freedoms of the              
European Single Market and were introduced in 1957 in the Treaty of Rome. The free               
movement of citizens to live and work in other countries is enshrined in European              
Union law and guarantees the rights of citizens of member states to equal treatment              
throughout the European Union. In 2004, the three Baltic states became part of the              
European Union but did not become part of the Schengen Zone, which allows visa free               
travel in every member state, until 2007. Only three countries - the United Kingdom,              
Ireland, and Sweden - allow complete freedom of movement of labour to the Baltic              
states in 2004 (Koikkalainen, 2011). In 2007, restrictions were lifted from the other             
European Union countries and EU8 emigrants had the right to live and work freely in               
them.  
  
 
(2.3) Estonian, Latvian, and Lithuanian Emigration After 2004 
  
From 2007 citizens could easily move to any other European Union country to              
seek better opportunities, but until 2008 relatively few took this opportunity. Data from             
each country’s statistics agencies shows that there was only an annual increase of             
around 1,000 emigrants from each country to another member state from 2004 to 2007              
(Hazans and Phillips, 2011) which is displayed in table 1 and graph 1, below on page                
19. The only exception to this is Lithuania in 2005 when emigration rose by 20,000 but                
then declined by almost the same amount the following year and hovered around 30,000              
in total until 2010. Reporting of migration statistics changed in Estonia in 2015, giving a               
more accurate and higher rate of emigration than had previously been reported, which is              
why migration rose from around 4,000 in 2014 to more than 13,000 in 2015.  
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Source: Statistics Estonia, Statistics Lithuania, Central Statistical Bureau of Latvia  
 
Graph 1: Annual emigration year-by-year 2004 - 2016 from Estonia, Latvia and 
Lithuania  
 
Table 1: Annual emigration year-by-year 2004 - 2016 from Estonia, Latvia and 
Lithuania  
 
Year Estonia Latvia Lithuania 
2004 2927 20,167 37,691 
2005 4610 17,643 57,885 
2006 5527 17,019 32,390 
2007 4,384 15,463 30,383 
2008 4,406 27,045 25,750 
2009 4,658 38,208 38,500 
2010 5,294 39,651 83,157 
2011 6,214 30,311 53,863 
2012 6,321 25,163 41,100 
2013 6,740 22,561 38,818 
2014 4,637 19,017 36,621 
2015 13,003 20,119 44,533 
2016 13,792 20,574 50,333 
Total  82,513 312,941 571,024 
Source: Statistics Estonia, Statistics Lithuania, Central Statistical Bureau of Latvia  
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But in 2008 as the world fell into recession, the economies of Estonia, Latvia, and                
Lithuania, which had been experiencing huge growth after joining the EU, were hit             
badly. Latvia was the worst affected with an 18% drop in GDP. Now, with fewer               
opportunities at home, workers started to take up their right to free movement. As with               
many other countries which suffer from a lack of economic opportunity, migration            
became an escape valve (Anelli & Peri, 2016). Combined, the three countries saw             
hundreds of thousands of people leave their home countries and move abroad. These             
emigrants were mostly young, under 45, and both low and high skilled. Latvia and              
Lithuania experienced a “brain drain” of highly educated workers (LSM, 2018;           
Kazlauskiene and Rinkevicius, 2006), while Estonia saw less highly educated people           
leave (​Anniste et al. 2012​). They mostly moved to the UK, Ireland, Finland, Norway,              
Sweden, and Germany, but migration patterns differed for each county. Finland was the             
destination country for the majority of Estonians, while the UK and Ireland were the              
most common destination for Latvians and Lithuanians. Many of these emigrants work            
in industries such as construction, food production, and agriculture and took           
opportunities below their educational level because the pay was still several times            
higher than in their home countries (Longhi and Rokicka, 2012). This has caused alarm              
amongst politicians and has become a much discussed topic in the media in all three               
countries. Efforts to bring people back home have been in vain. Net migration is still               
negative in Latvia and Lithuania, although since 2014 it has been positive in Estonia but               
only by several thousand. The amount of the population working in other countries is              
several times higher than in most European countries and many have not yet returned.              
Like the majority of other European countries, the Baltics have aging populations and a              
birth rate below the replacement level. The most visible trends which can be noticed              
across all three countries by demographers is that it is mostly young people who have               
left. This means that the populations that have stayed behind have a higher proportion of               
older people than young people, which is continuously exacerbated by the declining            
birth rate. The Latvian demographer Mihails Hazans argues this is starting to be             
reflected in political outcomes in his country “since the young leave and the old stay,               
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the electorate gets more conservative... further exacerbating anti-immigrant leanings”         
(​Ragozin,​ 2018). 
 
(2.4) Voting from abroad differences in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania  
 
Rules for the regulation of voting from abroad are different in Estonia, Latvia, and               
Lithuania. Each country allows its citizens to vote from overseas by post and in              
embassies, but Estonians can also vote online and around 90% of those that do, choose               
to do so (Solvak and Vassil, 2016). The one similarity is that all potential voters must                
register to vote, rather than be automatically enrolled by a local authority. But where              
those votes are counted is another matter. 
 
Estonia 
Residents living abroad or temporarily have the right to vote in elections. Each              
person will be sent an electronic voter card in advance of the voting day. If a voter is                  
permanently living abroad their votes are cast in the district of their former place of               
residence, or their ancestors, in Estonia. Online voting is permitted and arguably            
encouraged, as postal voters have to bear the costs of voting by post themselves.              
Registering by post entails sending a form and copy of your identity document to the               
foreign mission in your adopted country at least 30 days before election day. A postal               
vote and candidate list is then sent to the voter, who fills this in, and sends it back to the                    
foreign mission by a set date. ​The vote is not counted if the name, personal               
identification code and the number of the Riigikogu electoral district are not written on              
the outer envelope. 
The procedure is the same for people who are temporarily abroad, and voters who               
live permanently or temporarily abroad and did not vote by post can vote at the foreign                
mission. A foreign embassy must also allow voting at the premises on at least two days                
in the period between fifteen days and ten days before the election day. Ballots are then                
sent to Estonia by election day to be counted.  
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Latvia 
Latvians living abroad can vote by post or in foreign embassies. Their votes will               
be redirected to the Riga constituency rather than be counted in the constituency of their               
previous place of residence. If they vote by post, their completed ballot paper must have               
reached the foreign mission at least 30 days before the election. In order to register to                
vote abroad by post a Latvian passport must be presented along with the application              
form, by the voter or a third party. The passport will then be stamped with a mark                 
regarding participating in elections. A Latvian citizen temporarily abroad may vote at            
any foreign mission as long as they present a passport.  
 
Lithuania 
Residents living abroad or temporarily have the right to vote in national and local               
elections. Voting registration must be completed online, and voters only need an ID to              
do so. As there are two rounds for each Lithuanian national election, citizens must              
register for each vote separately and then vote twice, once in each round. It is not                
mandatory to vote in both rounds. Online applications to vote will then be sent to the                
closest foreign embassy to where the voter lives, and that is where they can then send                
their vote by mail. Voting online does not exist in Lithuania, so the only way to vote in                  
a foreign election is to do so by postal vote or by physically going to the embassy in                  
person to do so. Turnout results suggest that Lithuanian residents who live abroad tend              
to vote in higher numbers in the first round of voting than the second.  
 
 
(2.5) Electoral Systems in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania  
 
It should briefly be mentioned that Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania all have some              
form of proportional electoral system. This means that even a small vote gain for any               
party could turn into extra seats in parliament, unlike in a majoritarian system.             
Lithuania has a mixed system, and two rounds of voting, because of this I shall use the                 
second round of voting as it determines the formation of the government more than the               
first. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
​In this chapter I will explain the methodology which will determine the results of               
this thesis. An impact analysis using a counterfactual model will be used to estimate the               
likelihood of election outcomes in Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia had mass migration            
not taken place in the years following 2004. Demographic data has been taken from the               
national statistics agency in each country and the European Social Survey. Voting data             
has been taken from each country’s electoral commission. I will be studying one             
election from each country and these took place in 2014 (Latvia), 2015 (Estonia), and              
2016 (Lithuania). Below I have outlined the methods and data used, as well as the               
limitations with both. ​Once again, I have listed my research questions below to remind              
readers what I am trying to find out: 
 
1. How have voting demographics changed in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania since 
2004? 
2. What political forces have been strengthened as a result of outward migration?  
 
 
(3.1) Impact Evaluation and Counterfactual Models 
 
An impact evaluation measures the potential positive and negative effects of an             
implemented, or planned, change, such as introducing a new policy against the present             
day reality of not having the new policy. Using quantitative data it is possible to               
estimate the likely outcomes and impact the new policy could have and whether it is               
worth implementing in the future. Or whether it was worth implementing in the first              
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place. The drawback of using an impact evaluation is that we can never have both               
scenarios - reality and a time when a new policy has been introduced - co-existing in the                 
same space at the same time. Thousands of people did emigrate after 2004, so we               
cannot possibly know what would have happened if they had not. So the way to get                
around this problem is to create one of the scenarios - also known as counterfactual               
model - while keeping it as realistic as possible at the same time using available data.                
Counterfactual models rely on assumptions, but the fewer assumptions and the more            
facts, such as data, they include the better. This is because it makes the counterfactual               
model more accurate and based on evidence rather than assumptions. For example,            
because statistics agencies collect data on the age and gender of emigrants I can use this                
data to calculate how this affects men and women of different ages and match it with                
home country election outcome data. Both characteristics have been shown to influence            
the likelihood of casting a vote so having firm data on these two characteristics, and an                
approximate amount of people, makes my counterfactual model more accurate because I            
can calculate an increased likelihood of voting for a specific group of people rather than               
assuming for everyone or no-one.  
 
Using an impact analysis and a counterfactual model are relevant methods for this              
thesis because I am trying to estimate the impact that migration has had on voting               
turnout and election outcomes. Therefore, I need to use a method that measures the              
impact that this has had. The counterfactual model is needed to create my alternative              
scenario and I cannot complete this analysis without one, since I could not know what               
would have happened if emigration had not occurred.  
 
In the literature I have read, and discussed above, regarding emigration and             
migration several studies have also employed these techniques in relation to measuring            
the impact of emigration on election outcomes. One of the most relevant methods for              
my thesis have been those used by Kostelka (2017) who looked at the impact on turnout                
in home country elections in the EU8 countries and Bulgaria and Romania after they              
joined the European Union. Using an impact evaluation and counterfactual model, he            
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calculated what turnout could have been in elections had people not emigrated. He did              
this by calculating the amount of emigrants who were likely to vote and then adding this                
to the total nationwide turnout rate in the sixth democratic election of each country. This               
is similar to what I am doing in this thesis. His results are conservative and based on                 
data which is likely to have underestimated the true amount of emigration, which is also               
an issue I face. Mahmoud et al (2013), who researched the effect of emigration on               
Moldova, also used a counterfactual model. But unlike this thesis, they make an             
assumption that all emigrants who moved to the west voted for opposition parties to get               
their results, which I am not going to do as it does not seem realistic to make that                  
assumption.  
 
More information about how I created my counterfactual and the data needed for              
the models is outlined below in section 4. 
 
 (3.2) Country Selection  
 
As outlined in the introduction, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania have been selected             
for this study as they are the countries which have seen the biggest decline in population                
through outward migration after joining the EU in the Baltic Sea region. Poland, which              
also joined in 2004, has seen more people migrate but it calculates as a smaller share of                 
the population as a whole. I wanted to carry-out a comparative study because, as far as I                 
know, only a small amount of research has been carried out on the effect of emigration                
on European countries and their political systems. Making the study comparative will            
enable me to draw more relevant conclusions and see if there any trends reflected in               
more than one country. Emigrants from the Baltic states have also been more mobile              
than those in central Europe so it makes sense to compare these countries (Hazan and               
Philips 2011). I will compare the way in which emigration has affected election             
outcomes to see if there are any similarities or differences in each country. For example,               
which forces - if any - have strengthened and how voter demographics have changed.              
Lithuania and Latvia are interesting countries to study regarding migration as significant            
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amounts of their populations have emigrated since 2008, around 10% in Latvia and             
approximately 15% from Lithuania who mostly leave to work in the UK or Ireland.  
Estonia is an interesting comparison to these countries because fewer people have left.             
There has also not been a significant case of brain drain in Estonia, and the migration                
destination is different with more Estonians going to Finland instead of Ireland or the              
UK. The three Baltic countries also have different ways of, and rules concerning, voting              
from abroad which could influence people when deciding whether or not they will vote.              
This is especially true for emigrants who have moved to the United Kingdom because              
after accession eastern European migrants spread out all over the country, and did not              
cluster in the capital where it is easy to access an embassy and cast a vote. ​(​Longhi and                   
Rokicka, 2012). This was not a problem for Polish migrants, who can open temporary              
polling stations abroad and across the relevant country, but Latvia, and Lithuania, do not              
do this meaning if citizens want to vote in person they have to travel across the county,                 
potentially, taking time off work and paying a lot of money to do so.  
 
 
(3.3) Data 
 
Two kinds of data have been used in this thesis: demographic and ballots cast. The                
demographic data has been taken from Statistics Estonia, the Central Statistical Bureau            
of Latvia, Statistics Lithuania, and the European Social Survey. The data collected from             
each country’s statistics agency shows how many people have emigrated each year from             
each country and their age and gender. To be categorised as an emigrant a person must                
have left their home country for at least one year or deregistered from the population list                
in their home country. There are limitations to using this data which I have outlined               
below.  
 
I am comparing and using data that was gathered from 2004 onwards and until the                
year of, or before, the election I studied for each country. This is because I need to                 
create an as accurate picture as possible of the hundreds of thousands of people who               
have left since 2004 and mostly not returned. Each year must be added together to give                
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a total migration figure to work with for each election. The data gathered by each               
agency has improved overtime and after 2011 each country’s estimates became more            
accurate. More characteristic details were also collected, such as marital status,           
citizenship and ethnicity. Before this date most countries only registered the age or             
gender of the person who had left and very few other details, if any. This extra                
demographic data gathered after 2011, as shown above, can influence the likelihood of             
casting a vote or selecting a political party. ​Therefore, it makes sense to use what is                 
available from this data to create my migrant profiles because it will help me calculate a                
more accurate probability of voting for each outcome, even if I can only use the               
information to add descriptive details. As expected, the data collected by national            
statistics offices varies between countries and not all of it is comparable. Lithuania has              
more detailed emigration data starting in 2004 than Latvia and Estonia.  
 
European Social Survey (ESS) data is needed to gage a likelihood of how people               
would have voted, and who they would have voted for. It is integral to constructing               
voter and emigrant profiles. I have used data from the most recent surveys for each               
country on questions concerning political participation, which gathers data on people’s           
feelings towards political parties, their likelihood of voting and who they voted for at              
the last election. The ESS takes place every two years and the most recent survey               
completed by each country are 2016 for Estonia and Lithuania, and 2008 for Latvia. The               
data for Estonia and Lithuania are particularly useful as data for each country was              
gathered during or just after an election so will have captured voters reflections on              
political engagement while they were still caught up in the election cycle. This means              
the questions may well have had more salience with interviewees’ answers as the topic              
would have had an increased presence in the media at the time and their answers are                
quite likely to have reflected how they actually voted. The data for Latvia is less useful                
as national elections took place in 2006 and 2010, although municipal elections did take              
place the following year, in 2009.   
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Turning to election data, this thesis uses data from the Estonian National Electoral              
Committee, Central Election Committee of Latvia, and the Central Electoral          
Commission of the Republic of Lithuania. The data shows how many citizens voted in              
each election and the outcome of each election. The elections I will study were held in                
2014 (Latvia), 2015 (Estonia) and 2016 (Lithuania).  
 
So in summary, ​emigration data gathered after 2004 from sending countries             
(Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) has been used to create profiles of those immigrants             
who migrated. While European Social Survey data is needed to create profiles of the              
home country population who did not emigrate. Election results data has also been used              
to calculate how election results could have changed.  
 
 
(3.4)​ ​Variable Selection 
 
Data regarding age, gender, marital status, ethnicity, citizenship, education and           
place of origin are collected by statistics agencies in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania and              
therefore have potential to be used as variables. However, the form that this data is               
freely available to the public, and therefore data I can access, does not always match up                
with the information I need to create my calculations. Initially I planned to use age,               
gender, marital status, and citizenship as independent variables for this thesis. But after             
looking at the data for all three countries, which is categorized and collected in different               
ways, I could only use age and gender in a comparative format. In order to calculate my                 
predictions, I needed data for marital status, citizenship and education broken down by             
age and gender categories, so that I can work out how many men and women of each                 
age left and how they voted. But most of the characteristic data is not available in that                 
format. Or at least, not for free. All countries can provide data on how many married                
persons or people with citizenship left, but cannot then provide information on how old              
they are and in some cases what gender they are. Age and gender are strong predictors                
of voting likelihood and so are essential variables in my calculations - if I do not have                 
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those categorizations I cannot use the data. Reasons for selecting these two variables             
were outlined previously in the literature review, but are also recapped below.  
 
Age​: the likelihood of voting is connected to how old a person is. Young people                
are known to be less likely to vote, whereas it is statistically more likely that older                
people will vote. But this likelihood decreases as a person reaches old age and started to                
withdraw from society (Smets and Van Ham 2013). ​This is born out in turnout               
statistics. 
 
Gender​: in the past, men were thought to vote more than women. But in recent                
years this has changed. In elections in the USA more women have voted than men since                
1980 (Dittmar 2018). But overall, voting is fairly evenly split between men and women.              
Research also suggests that a voting gap exists between the genders and that women are               
more likely to for left-wing parties (Abendschön and Steinmetz 2014). As education and             
voting are connected, the increase in women in higher education, and the decrease in              
men studying at a higher level, may be one of the reasons for higher turnout amongst                
women.  
 
Some of the data that was not specific enough to be used to create variables can                 
still be used to answer my research question: How have voting demographics changed             
in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania since 2004? 
 
A second factor in my variable selection is that I need all the data to be of the same                    
type because this is a comparative study. If I were to have marital data categorized into                
sex and gender for Lithuania and Latvia but not Estonia, I could not use it anyway                
because I could not compare all three countries to each other. Thirdly it must match data                
collected by the European Social Survey. So, with those limitations in mind, I have              
chosen to use ‘gender’ and ‘age’ as my independent variables from the demographic             
data provided by each country. I have grouped them into age groups of five years and                
started at 20, to make sure the demographics are all voters. Data from the European               
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Social Survey has been used to create my dependent variable which is ‘voted’. This              
variable was made using data from the question “voted in the last election” to which               
interviewees could answer ‘yes’, ‘no’, or something else. I then created a binary             
variable of this data coded 0 or 1 for yes or no. A second variable I made with this data                    
was “party voted for”, which came from the question “which party did you vote for at                
the last election?” This was needed to predict what party emigrants may have voted for.  
  
So in summary, my dependent variables are ‘voted’ and ‘party voted for’, and my               
independent variables are ‘gender’ and ‘age’. 
 
(3.5) Limitations 
 
 
There are limitations with the migration and European Social Survey (ESS) data.             
In outward migration literature researchers have used several types of data and disagree             
on which is the most accurate. Data is usually either gathered by the receiving or               
sending countries. Neither can claim to be entirely accurate as they both rely on              
individuals to register in their new country or deregister from their home country             
themselves. For example, exit data relies on individuals telling the government they are             
leaving. This is not a mandatory process and many people do not do this. Whereas data                
gathered in the receiving country is usually made up of applications for work permits or               
national insurance schemes which are needed to work legally, so the majority of people              
do register. But this assumes that everyone in these countries is registering upon arrival,              
and this has been shown to be not true. It also does not suggest how long people will                  
stay abroad. Using receiving country data would mean having to find data from each              
receiving country in Europe and then combine it together to get a total estimate - which                
would still be incomplete because not everybody registers. Using sending country data            
simplifies the process, as it would be a single data set for each country, but this data is                  
considered by many researchers to be of an inferior quality as it significantly             
underestimates the numbers of people who have left. One of the data sets other              
researchers have used is national insurance or work permits issued to foreign nationals.             
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But this data is still not perfect as some workers only come to work for a short time and                   
then leave again, but have still been issued a unique ID card or number which increases                
the total numbers of permanent arrivals. For example, 80,000 Personal Public Service            
numbers have been issued to Lithuanians living in Ireland since 2004, but looking at the               
census data in 2016 less than half of that number are recorded as living in Ireland                
permanently. Census data can, and often have been used, but as many censuses are              
taken only once a decade their estimates could also be out of date. So, in conclusion,                
whichever set of data I use none can claim to be absolutely 100% accurate. But I have                 
chosen to use the data sets created by each sending country because the other option is                
combining data sets from 27 different countries which may not define a migrant or              
emigrant in the same ways, and therefore may not be comparable.  
 
As mentioned above, the ESS data for Latvia is not up-to-date and is 10 years old,                 
it would have been preferable to have newer data that was collected recently. However,              
the questions asked in 2008 are the same as asked in the newer data, and therefore is                 
comparable with the 2016 survey data from Estonia and Lithuania.  
 
​Another problem with the ESS data is that Latvia had parties merge in to coalitions                
or collapse in between elections. Therefore, I have had to assign the votes of parties that                
have become coalitions to the relevant party grouping. In this case the party formerly              
known as the New Era Party has joined the Unity Coalition, so these votes are added to                 
the votes cast in the 2012 election for the Unity Coalition. Another party, For Fatherland               
and Freedom/LNNK, has become a member of National Alliance, so the votes for             
FFF/LNNK will be added to the vote share for National Alliance. This was not a               
problem for Estonia and Lithuania as the ESS data was collected the same year, or the                
year before, elections took place so the parties people say they voted for are the same as                 
the parties in the government or opposition.   
 
My models are counterfactual, although based on empirical evidence. This means            
they can only ever be considered estimates of what might have happened, so this is a                
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further limitation. It would also have been better to have more specific demographic             
data, but my reasons for my selection are outlined in the data section above.  
 
 
(3.6) Parties  
 
As mentioned above, to create my counterfactual I have used data from the ESS               
which polled people on how they voted in the most recent elections. For my model I am                 
going to use the four parties in each country which attracted the most ballots from               
voters at the elections I am studying and would, therefore, probably most likely have              
been voted for by most emigrants if they had voted. In Estonia, this means I am using                 
data concerning the Reform Party, Centre Party, Social Democratic Party, and Pro            
Patria Res Publica. In Lithuania, I will look at the probability of voting for Farmers and                
Greens Union, Homeland Union, Social Democrats, and the Liberal Movement. As           
mentioned above in my limitations section, Latvia is problematic as the European Social             
Survey data is from 2008 and the election I selected for study is 2012, and several                
parties collapsed between those two dates. Therefore, the four parties I have included             
are: Union of Greens and Farmers, Unity Coalition, Harmony, and National Alliance.  
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CHAPTER FOUR  
 
EMIGRANT AND VOTER PROFILES  
 
In order to create my counterfactual and carry out the impact analysis, I made a                
series of emigrant and voter profiles using the data available from statistics agencies and              
the European Social Survey. These are needed to take the assumptions out of the              
counterfactual and to make them evidence based which will give a more accurate result.              
Below I have outlined how these profiles have been made and what they show.  
 
Emigration Data 
 
I used emigration data from each country’s office of national statistics, relying on              
their totals for migration. For age and gender this data is categorised annually in              
five-year groupings from 0 to 85 plus or 95 plus and by male and female. But for other                  
characteristics sometimes only a total of each gender, or total of males or females, is               
available. The data is rarely broken down into age groups, gender, or citizenship for              
every characteristic. Where applicable for the data I selected to use, I removed data              
groups of emigrants who were aged 0-19 from the migration totals. My data starts with               
the 20-24 years of age category meaning everyone included has the possibility of             
voting. I collected emigration data from statistics agencies from 2004, until the year             
before or of the most recent election for people aged 0 to 85 plus. As Estonia’s elections                 
take place in March I used data from 2004 until 2014, the year before the election.                
There were also several other reasons for this. The first is because in 2015 a new                
reporting method was introduced to more accurately measure emigration and migration           
by Statistics Estonia, and as a result, emigration is around twice the level it was for the                 
preceding years. Emigration is seasonal, with people generally leaving in the summer            
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and autumn months for jobs or to study abroad, so the majority of those who emigrated                
from Estonia in 2015 probably did so after the election, so I have chosen not to include                 
these statistics. But for Latvia and Lithuania I also included data from the year of the                
election because they took place in October, more than three-quarters of the way             
through the year. Many emigrants from Latvia and Lithuania do work in seasonal jobs,              
so I think it is fair to make an assumption that most emigrants do leave at the start of the                    
summer, and so would be more likely to be out of the country if an election took place                  
in the later part of the year. There is also a higher likelihood that they may not have                  
registered to take part in elections if they were outside of the country during the               
registration period. This is also the case for students who study abroad, as their school               
year would start in September or October. Emigration data is not available month by              
month so I had to include data sets for whole years In the below table, the emigration                 
total is shown and the total when under 20 year olds are removed. These are the figures                 
that went into determining my probabilities and are shown in table 2.  
 
Table 2: Emigration Data for Relevant* Years, Totals and Over 20 Years Old  
 
Emigration Estonia Latvia Lithuania 
Total 55,718 272,248 571,024 
20+ 43,664 222,031 451,813 
Source: Statistics Estonia, Statistics Lithuania, Central Statistical Bureau of Latvia 
*Estonia 2004-2014, Latvia 2004-2014, Lithuania 2004-2016 
 
This data was categorized into gender by all three countries, with everyone counted              
being registered as either male or female. This age and gender data has been used to                
create my profiles, variables, and probabilities. Other data collected by statistics           
agencies includes region of origin, marital status, citizenship, and education level.           
However, these are not available in a comparable format for all three countries so I               
cannot include them in my calculations. For example, while each country categorized            
marital status as - at least - married, single, or widowed, no country specified both the                
age and gender of these people. Likewise, the citizenship of emigrants was not always              
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categorized by age and gender. This data can, however, be used descriptively to add              
detail to my profiles.  
 
Looking at the data discussed above in this form, there are some visible trends I                
can see. It is possible to see that emigration rose after the financial crisis; very quickly                
for Latvia and Lithuania in 2008 and 2009, but more gradually for Estonia which didn’t               
see a significant increase until 2010 and 2011. None of these emigration levels have yet               
fallen to their pre-2008 levels. In Latvia and Lithuania slightly more men than women              
emigrate, but it hovers around the 50% mark for both. But in Estonia more women have                
migrated in total than men, with the figures showing 46% for men and 54% for women,                
and this has consistently been the case for several years. Most emigrants are aged              
between 20 and 50 in all countries, with 25-29 year olds being the most mobile and                
leaving in the highest quantities. However, in all countries from the age of 55 onwards               
women emigrating vastly outnumber men, in some years by as much as three times              
higher. In all three cases the dominant ethnic group (Estonians, Latvians, and            
Lithuanians) make up the majority of emigrants each year and overtime. The majority of              
emigrants are single, at last 50% of those that leave, then around 24% are married and                
the rest are categorised as divorced, widowed or unknown. Most emigrants migrate to             
another European Union country.  
 
European Social Survey Data Profiles 
 
To make the profiles of home country populations and voting demographics I used              
European Social Survey and the data it collects every two years. After downloading the              
most recent data sets for Estonia (2016), Lithuania (2016) and Latvia (2008) I selected              
the same variables for study that could be found in the national statistics offices data.               
These were: age and gender. As well as these variables, I used data from the politics                
questions that interviewees were asked in each survey. The questions asked in each             
country are the same, which makes comparing the answers and data possible. Of these              
questions, I included data that measured voter turnout (question/ variable: “Voted in            
Last National Election”) and which political party interviewees voted for at the last             
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election (question/ variable: “Party Voted For in Last National Election”). Data was also             
collected about citizenship, marital status, and education, but it was not comparable            
with data from national statistics agencies and so could not be included in my impact               
analysis or counterfactual. Having created these profiles of emigrants and home country            
voters, I could then work out the probability of emigrants voting and for which party.  
 
Election and Voting Data 
  
Data regarding how emigrants vote from abroad is not published so I could not use                
that, if it is even collected, in my calculations. This is why voting data from European                
Social Survey was used instead when I created my profiles. Turnout data was taken              
from the election commissions in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania and the totals for valid              
votes - excluding spoiled ballots - was used where possible. For Lithuania, the second              
round of voting was used.  
 
Probabilities  
 
To calculate the probabilities of emigrants voting and to create my counterfactual I              
needed five sets of numbers for each country. These were: 
 
1. The total number of emigrants  
2. The likelihood of home country voters casting a ballot  
3. The likelihood of home country voters voting for a specific party 
4. The likelihood of an emigrant voting if they had remained in their home country 
5. The likelihood of an emigrant who stayed voting for a specific party  
 
The first number was the most straightforward to find. Using emigration data from              
national statistics agencies in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, I combined the amount of             
people that left each year to get a total emigration figure for each country. I used data                 
starting in 2004 for all countries and finished the year before each election I was               
looking at. As mentioned above, the data was categorised in five-year age groupings             
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and by male and female. This gave me between 12-14 numbers for each country with               
age categories of voters (as some countries categorised up to 100 and others only 85+,               
for example). This was then doubled when gender was introduced as a variable             
alongside age, giving me the total number of men and women, combined and separately,              
who had left each country in each category. This gave me a basic profile outline of                
emigrants. I deleted data about emigrants under 20 to make sure I had a demographic               
that could vote and take part in national elections. In Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania you               
cannot vote in national elections if you are under 18, so including this data would make                
my calculations less accurate. As the data is banded in five-year categories I could only               
start at 15 or 20, but not 18.  
 
In order to find out the likelihood of home country voters casting a ballot I used                 
data from the European Social Survey (ESS) to create profiles of voters who had              
remained in their country. I used the same data from the ESS that I had taken from the                  
national statistics agencies to create a profile based on age and gender. It was necessary               
to use similar data because otherwise emigrant and home country profiles would not             
have been comparable. However, I also used data about whether these people had voted              
or not in the last election, which is an answer to a question on the ESS. I created binary                   
variables for ‘voted’ and ‘gender’, and a categorical variable for ‘age’, splitting the data              
into five-year groups to make it the same as the emigration data. Then using a logistic                
regression, I calculated the predicted probability that each age group (‘age’) and age             
group and gender (‘age and gender’) voted in the last election. This gave me 16 figures                
when simply calculating ‘age’ and 32 when calculating ‘age and gender’.  
 
I used the same ESS data when calculating the likelihood of voting for each party.                
I selected the four parties which received the most votes in each election and used the                
ESS answer data that came from the question “Who did you vote for in the last                
election?” This was a standard question in all three countries’ surveys so was readily              
comparable. Again, I used a logistic regression to calculate the probabilities of voters             
voting for each of the four parties. 
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Lastly to find out the probability estimate of emigrants voting for each party, I               
multiplied the likelihood of voting for home country voters with the figures for total              
migration by ‘age’ and ‘age and gender’. This figure was then multiplied with the              
likelihood of voting for each specific party. This figure gave me the amount of votes               
that could have been cast by emigrants. Finally, the amount of fictional votes was added               
to the real amount of votes cast in each election to see what the impact could have been                  
if emigrants never left and voted. This process is shown below in figures 1 (page 40)                
and 2 (page 41).  
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Figure 1: Model 1 (blue) and Model 2 (green)  
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Figure 2: Finding the Probability of an Age and Gender group Voting for a Specific 
Party 
 
The results of these calculations for the variables age and gender for Estonia, Latvia,               
and Lithuania are displayed below in table 3 (page 42). The results show that for every                
age group Estonians are predicted to be more likely to vote than Latvians or              
Lithuanians. The country where emigrants are least likely to vote is Lithuania, with             
Lithuanian women voting in the smallest numbers - especially in the 20-24 years             
category. In contrast, Estonian women are the most likely to vote in all age categories,               
with the most likely to vote in age category 60-64. Overall, the likelihood of voting               
increases with age in all countries and for both genders. The results for the likelihood               
of voting for each party, by each age group and gender, for each country can be found in                  
the appendices (Appendix 1 (Estonia), Appendix 2 (Latvia), Appendix 3 (Lithuania))           
starting on page 89. The results of these calculations are discussed in detail in chapter 5.  
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Table 3: Predicted Estimation of Voting of Age Group and Gender in Each Country 
 
Gender* Age  Estonia Latvia Lithuania 
f 20-24 0.6115049 0.491477 0.2854026 
m  0.5557395 0.4304557 0.3061961 
f 25-29 0.6625318 0.5577596 0.3544554 
m  0.6094125 0.4965443 0.3776214 
f 30-34 0.7037547 0.6131851 0.4215269 
m  0.6537329 0.5535003 0.4460476 
f 35-39 0.7360575 0.6574258 0.4828046 
m  0.6890803 0.6001155 0.507761 
f 40-44 0.7605326 0.6911377 0.5358352 
m  0.7162322 0.6363476 0.5605618 
f 45-49 0.7782188 0.7153518 0.5794898 
m  0.7360547 0.6627612 0.6036111 
f 50-54 0.7899661 0.7310731 0.6135995 
m  0.7493159 0.6800882 0.6369899 
f 55-59 0.7963791 0.7390631 0.6385215 
m  0.7565877 0.6889484 0.6612362 
f 60-64 0.7977999 0.7397389 0.6547838 
m  0.7582019 0.6896995 0.6769935 
f 65-69 0.7943053 0.7331368 0.662848 
m  0.7542336 0.6823731 0.6847886 
f 70-74 0.7857069 0.7189092 0.6629762 
m  0.744499 0.6666695 0.6849125 
f 75-79 0.7715516 0.6963539 0.6551729 
m  0.7285621 0.6420098 0.6773699 
f 80-84 0.751128 0.6644993 0.6391836 
m  0.7057609 0.6076662 0.6618787 
f 85-89 0.7234964 0.6222952 0.6145516 
m  0.6752699 0.5630143 0.6379183 
Source: author’s own data 
*F stands for female, M stands for male 
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Model Fit 
 
        In tables 3 and 4 below, the Pseudo R2, also known as a goodness-of-fit measure, 
results for how well the model fits my calculations are shown. The results are on a scale 
between 0 and 1, and the closer to 1 the better the result is at explaining the relationship 
between my variables. Number of observations means the number of people surveyed in 
the ESS data.  
 
Table 4: Fit of Model for ‘Age and Gender’  
 
Country Estonia Latvia Lithuania  
Number of Observations 1,706 1,929 1,730 
LR chi2 31.74 97.21 51.98 
 Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Fit of Model (Pseudo R2) 0.0159 0.0370 0.0233 
Source: author’s own data 
 
Table 5: Fit of Model for Likelihood of Voting for Each Party 
 
Country Estonia Latvia Lithuania  
Number of Observations 962 558 632 
LR chi2 51.90 37.97 29.63 
 Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0005 
Fit of Model (Pseudo R2) 0.0204 0.0261 0.0184 
Source: author’s own data  
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CHAPTER FIVE  
 
RESULTS  
 
The results of this thesis will be laid out in this section. First, I compare the total                  
votes predicted to be cast when age and gender are used as variables for all three                
countries, then how these votes contrast with each country’s migration rate, and the             
voter turnout for the chosen elections. Finally, the impact of these predicted votes on              
individual parties will be shown and discussed.  
 
5.1 Effect of Age and Gender on Predicted Turnout 
Number of Votes Predicted by Age and Gender 
Table 6: Total Votes Predicted by Age and Gender Variables 
Country Total Women Men 
Estonia 26,774 15,194 11,579 
Latvia 130,361 67,210 63,151 
Lithuania 196,484 94,914 101,570 
Source: author’s own data 
The results for the total number of votes predicted to be cast by my calculations are                 
shown above in Table 6. Lithuania, receives the most votes at almost 200,000 followed              
by Latvia and then Estonia. This is not very surprising as Lithuania has seen by far the                 
highest amount of emigration from the country, so it follows that it should also receive               
the largest amount of predicted votes.  
The above table also shows the amount of predicted votes broken down by gender.               
In two countries - Estonia and Latvia - women are predicted to cast more votes than                
men, but in Lithuania men are predicted to be more likely to vote than women. For                
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Estonia, this is unsurprising as many more women than men have emigrated. However,             
in Latvia and Lithuania the emigration rate of men and women have been almost equal,               
so it is interesting to see that the votes are not equally shared between the genders.  
 
Predicted Votes for Each Country Compared with Total Migration 
Table 7: Predicted Votes for Each Country Compared with Total Migration 
Country Predicted Votes* Total Migration** % of Migration 
Estonia 
26,774 
38,952 68.74 
Latvia 
130,361 
222,031  59.25 
Lithuania 
196,484 
451,813 43.49 
* Source: author’s own data, 
**Source: Statistics Estonia, Statistics Lithuania, Central Statistical Bureau of Latvia 
  
 Table 7, above, and graph 2, below, show the number of people predicted to cast               
a vote compared to the total emigration rate of people over 20 years of age. Estonia has                 
by far the highest predicted turnout at 68.74% or almost 27,000 votes of a potential               
39,000. Latvia has the second highest emigrant turnout rate with more than 59%             
predicted to turnout. Lithuania has the lowest predicted turnout rate at 43.49%. As             
mentioned above, Lithuania also has the highest emigration rate so, this is a particularly              
low rate of turnout. 
 Below the results for total votes and total emigration have been compared on a              
single graph. It emphasises how high the likelihood of voting is by Estonian emigrants              
compared to Latvia and Lithuania. 
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Source: author’s own data / Statistics Estonia, Statistics Lithuania, Central Statistical Bureau of 
Latvia 
 ​Graph 2: Predicted Votes compared with Total Migration for Estonia, Latvia and 
Lithuania  
 
 ​Emigrant Turnout for Each Country Compared with Election Turnout 
Table 8, below, shows the likelihood of emigrant turnout to the actual election              
turnout. We can see that emigrants, if they had remained, are predicted to vote at a                
higher rate than people who stayed behind in Estonia and Lithuania. Lithuania and             
Estonia are significantly higher with turnout increases for the emigrant population of            
4.54% and 5.50%, but Latvian emigrants are only 0.36% more likely to vote when              
compared to the election turnout. 
Table 8: Emigrant Turnout Compared with Home Country Population Election Turnout  
Country Emigrant Turnout (%)* Election Turnout (%)** Difference 
Estonia 68.74 64.20 +4.54 
Latvia  59.21 58.85 +0.36 
Lithuania 43.49 37.99 +5.50 
*Source: Author’s own data  
** Source: Estonian National Electoral Committee, Central Election Committee of Latvia, 
Central Electoral Commission of the Republic of Lithuania  
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Table 9, below, shows the predicted votes as a percentage of the total votes cast               
in each election. Estonia’s votes equate to 4.63% of the total turnout, but votes for the                
Latvian and Lithuanian elections are much higher, at almost 15% and 21.50%            
respectively. Graph 3, next page, shows the predicted votes in relation to the election              
turnout totals in each country’s election, although it should be kept in mind that this is                
the result for Lithuania’s second round of voting.  
 
Table 9: The Increase in Turnout for Each Countries’ Election if Emigrants had Not 
Left and Continued to Voted 
Country Predicted Votes* Election Turnout** % of Turnout 
Estonia 
26,774 
577,910 4.63 
Latvia 
130,361 
913,491 14.29 
Lithuania 
196,484 
913,752 21.50 
*Source: Author’s own data  
** Source: Estonian National Electoral Committee, Central Election Committee of Latvia, 
Central Electoral Commission of the Republic of Lithuania 
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Source: Author’s own data / Estonian National Electoral Committee, Central Election 
Committee of Latvia, Central Electoral Commission of the Republic of Lithuania 
 
Graph 3: Total Turnout When Predicted Votes are Added to Election Turnout 
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Estonia  
Table 10: Predicted Votes for Estonian Emigrants by Age and Gender  
Age 
Female 
Emigration** Votes* 
Men 
Emigration** Votes* 
20-24 3,593 2,197 2,663 1,480 
25-29 4,568 3,026 3,636 2,216 
30-34 3,231 2,274 3,063 2,002 
35-39 2,451 1,804 2,553 1,759 
40-44 2,216 1,685 2,162 1,548 
45-49 1,939 1,509 1,557 1,146 
50-54 1,557 1,230 1,003 752 
55-59 881 702 501 379 
60-64 308 246 185 140 
65-69 228 181 67 51 
70-74 148 116 61 45 
75-79 149 115 46 34 
80-84 92 69 24 17 
85-89 55 40 15 10 
Total  21,416 15,194 17,536 11,579 
*Source: Author’s own data  
** Source: Statistics Estonia  
 
 
As mentioned above, Estonian women are predicted to cast more votes than             
men, with 15,194 female emigrants predicted to vote compared to 11,579 men. This is              
56.74%, the highest female vote of all three counties. When the results of my              
calculations are broken down further into gender and age categories they show that             
women are more likely to vote than men at every stage of their lives. The biggest gaps                 
between men and women casting votes are in 20-24 and 25-29 age categories, which              
can be seen below in graph 4, next page, which compares predicted votes to emigration               
rate. Between the ages of 35 and 44, the voting rate gap narrows considerably, but then                
widens as women are far more likely to vote than men when they are over 50, and in                  
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some categories by as much as four times that of the male voting rate. The data for                 
migration rate and votes cast can be seen side-by-side in table 10, above.  
 
 
Source: author’s own data 
 
Graph 4: Predicted Votes for Estonian Emigrants by Age and Gender  
 
​Graphs 5 and 6, below and on the next page, show the migration rate and predicted                   
votes of each gender. As mentioned previously in this thesis Estonians have the highest              
predicted rate of voting when compared to Latvia and Lithuania. This is reflected in the               
charts below as you can see that at every age group the majority are likely to vote, even                  
in the youngest age group categories. Again, the highest numbers of votes are likely to               
be cast by the 20 to 34 years old age groups, but this is because these groups also have                   
the highest emigration rate. 
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                                   Source: Author’s own data / Statistics Estonia  
 
Graph 5: Predicted Vote Share Compared with Estonian Female Emigration  
 
 
 
                                   Source: Author’s own data / Statistics Estonia  
 
Graph 6: Predicted Vote Share of Estonian Male Emigration  
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Latvia 
        The results for Latvia show that, when age and gender are used as variables, 
67,210 women are predicted to cast votes and 63,151 men. This means 51.56% of the 
predicted votes are cast by women. Compared with the Estonian votes this is much 
smaller turnout gap between men and women. Graph 7, below, shows these results. In 
total women cast around 4,000 more votes than men. These results are shown in full and 
by age category in table 11, next page, and graph 7.  
 
  
  ​Source: author’s own data 
Graph 7: Predicted Votes for Latvian Emigrants by Age Group and Gender  
 
By looking at the results in this format we can see that women cast more votes in                  
their 20s, and are then outvoted by men until they reach their early 50s. Women then                
cast more votes until the end of their lives. This is probably because women migrate in                
higher numbers than men after the age of 50 and probably because women also have a                
higher life expectancy than men do. In total, this means women are predicted to cast the                
most votes, in comparison to the Estonian predicted votes, the gap between the genders              
is the same with about 1,000 more female voters than men until the age of 30.  
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Table 11: Predicted Votes for Latvian Emigrants by Age Group and Gender Compared with 
Migration Rate 
Age 
Female 
Emigration** Votes* 
Men 
Emigration** Votes* 
20-24 23,631 11,603 22,306 9,592 
25-29 21,837 12,163 22,523 11,171 
30-34 14,312 8,773 16,721 9,247 
35-39 10,421 6,847 13,497 8,098 
40-44 8,991 6,213 10,958 6,969 
45-49 8,186 5,853 9,195 6,087 
50-54 7,121 5,205 6,824 4,640 
55-59 5,009 3,702 4,465 3,072 
60-64 2,472 1,829 2,193 1,511 
65-69 1,958 1,435 1,477 1,007 
70-74 1,775 1,274 1,087 724 
75-79 1,370 954 794 510 
80-84 2,046 1,359 862 523 
Total  109,219 67,210 112,902 63,151 
*Source: Author’s own data  
** Source: Central Election Committee of Latvia 
 
 
Graphs 8 and 9, both on the next page, show Latvian total emigration by gender and                  
age and the votes my calculations predict will be cast. For both men and women the                
likelihood of voting increases with age, which is when the migration rate steadily             
declines. For both genders the 20-24 and 25-29 categories have the lowest likelihood of              
voting and are quite considerable when contrasted with the emigration rate, both            
categories having a turnout of less than 50% of the migration rate.   
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Source: Author’s own data/ ​Central Election Committee of Latvia 
 
Graph 8: Predicted Votes for Latvian Male Emigrants Compared to Migration Rate  
 
 
Source: Author’s own data/ ​Central Election Committee of Latvia 
 
Graph 9: Predicted Votes for Latvian Female Emigrants Compared to Migration Rate  
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Lithuania  
​The results for Lithuania show that men are predicted to cast 101,570 votes and                
women are predicted to cast 94,914 votes. This shows that, unlike in Estonia and Latvia,               
men are more likely to vote than women are. This is shown in graph 10, and table 12,                  
which are both below. There are approximately 6,000 more male voters despite the             
emigration rate being almost 50% men and 50% women. 
 
 
  ​Source: author’s own data 
Graph 10: Predicted Votes for Lithuanian Emigrants by Gender and Age Group  
 
The results show that several thousand more men are likely to vote in each age                 
group until the age of 50, when suddenly the roles are reversed. One clear example is                
the age group 80-84 years old, where 808 women are likely to vote and just 228 men.                 
This is similar to the emigration patterns of women, who tend to migrate in larger               
numbers than men after the age of 50, as mentioned above in the Latvian results section.                
This trend can also be seen in graph 10. Something that becomes very evident in graphs                
11 and 12, on page 57, ​is just how few young Lithuanians are predicted to vote                
compared with the very high emigration rate. This is particularly noticeable in every age              
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category below 45-49. The final results show that less than 50% of both genders are               
predicted to cast votes. The full results of predicted votes compared with emigration             
rate can be seen below in table 12.  
 
Table 12: Predicted Votes for Lithuanian Emigrants by Gender and Age Group 
Compared with Emigration Rate  
Age 
Female 
Emigration** Votes* 
Men 
Emigration** Votes* 
20-24 55500 15,840 53964 16,524 
25-29 51076 18,104 51062 19,282 
30-34 33295 14,035 35814 15,975 
35-39 24225 11,696 28901 14,675 
40-44 18820 10,084 22133 12,407 
45-49 15083 8,740 16036 9,680 
50-54 11185 6,863 10478 6,674 
55-59 6496 4,148 5182 3,427 
60-64 2936 1,922 2141 1,449 
65-69 1825 1,210 954 653 
70-74 1153 764 509 349 
75-79 969 635 340 230 
80-84 1365 872 371 246 
Total  223,928 94,914 227,885 101,570 
*Source: Author’s own data  
** Source: Central Electoral Commission of the Republic of Lithuania  
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Source: Author’s own data / ​Central Electoral Commission of the Republic of Lithuania  
 
Graph 11: Predicted Votes of Lithuanian Male Emigrants Compared with Emigration 
Rate 
 
  
Source: Author’s own data / ​Central Electoral Commission of the Republic of Lithuania  
 
Graph 12: Predicted Votes of Lithuanian Female Emigrants Compared with Emigration 
Rate  
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Predicted Votes for Each Country by Gender Calculated as Percentages  
Below the results for likelihood of voting by gender and age category are laid out                  
as percentages. Calculating the age categories of men and women as percentages allows             
me to compare the three countries more easily and on one chart. The results are               
presented in table 13 and on graph 13. Estonia clearly stands out as having a bigger gap                 
between male and female voters than the other two countries. Both Estonia and Latvia              
have more female voters than male. Lithuania has the highest number of male voters. 
 
Table 13: Predicted Votes Calculated as Percentage of total Emigration Rate in 
Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania by Gender 
Country Women Men 
Estonia 56.75 43.25 
Latvia 51.66 48.44 
Lithuania 48.30 51.69 
Source: author’s own data 
 
  ​Source: author’s own data 
 
Graph 13: Predicted Votes Calculated as Percentage of Emigration Rate in Estonia, 
Latvia and Lithuania by Gender 
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  ​Source: author’s own data 
 
Graph 14: Predicted Votes Calculated as a Percentage of Male Emigration 
in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania  
 
 
 ​Source: author’s own data 
 
Graph 15:  Predicted Votes Calculated as a Percentage of Female Emigration in 
Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania  
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My results presented in graphs 14 and 15, above on page 58, show that Estonians                
are predicted to have the highest turnout rate in all age categories and that women               
(graph 15) have a higher turnout rate than men in all categories. Estonian women vote               
in the highest numbers and Lithuania women the lowest. They also show how low              
Lithuanian participation rates are compared to the other countries until the mid 30s.  
 
Conclusion 
Before moving on to discussing the effects predicted votes have on parties, I will               
summarise the results so far. My results show that emigrants are predicted to vote in               
slightly higher numbers than people who have not migrated in Estonia and Lithuania,             
and that turnout would be increased if they had stayed in their home countries and not                
migrated. Estonians emigrants are predicted to cast the most votes compared to the             
emigration rate, and Lithuanians the least. My results show that older people are more              
likely to vote in higher numbers than young people in all countries, but that older people                
are less likely to migrate. This reflects research on age and voting that already exists, as                
well as knowledge about migration cycles. My results also show that women are more              
likely to vote than men in Estonia and Latvia, but men are more likely to vote than                 
women in Lithuania. In Estonia this reflects the migration trend of more women moving              
abroad than men. But in Latvia and Lithuania, men and women have migrated in equal               
numbers.  
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(5.2) Which Parties are Strengthened or Weakened?  
This section will outline the results relating to specific parties and how they would               
have gained or lost votes in each election. I will discuss each country separately starting               
with Estonia, then Latvia, and finally Lithuania, before concluding this results section.  
 
Estonia  
Table 14: Emigrant Votes Determined by Age and Gender for Estonian National 
Election 2015  
Results: 
Estonia  
Reform 
Party  
 
Centre 
Party  
 
Social 
Democrats  
Pro Patria 
and Res 
Publica  
Total votes 
 
  
Predicted 
votes 
11,304 
(42.22%) 
5,493 
(20.51%) 
6,054 
(22.61%) 
 
3,923 
(14.65%) 
26,774 
(+4.63%) 
Male 4,718 2,602 2,315 1,942 11,579 
Female  6,584 2,890 3,738 1,981 15,194 
*Source: Author’s own data  
 
 
Table 14 shows the predicted votes for each Estonian party. In total when age and                
gender are used as variables 26,774 votes would have been cast for the four parties that                
my research focuses on. This is 4.63% of the 2015 election turnout. The majority of               
these votes - 11,304 - would have been cast for the Reform Party, which was the party                 
that gained the biggest vote share at the election. The party gained 42.22% of the               
predicted votes, almost double the amount predicted for any other party. The Social             
Democrats were predicted to gain 6,054 votes, the second highest amount which is             
22.61% of the total predicted ballots. Votes for the Centre Party were slightly below              
5,500 and Pro Patria and Res Publica were predicted to receive 3,923.  
The results also show that there is a gender gap between women and men. Women                 
are more likely to vote for the Reform Party and the Social Democrats - more than                
two-thirds of female votes are cast for these two parties. It is these additional votes               
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which see both parties gain the most votes overall because both men and women are               
likely to vote for the Centre Party and Pro Patria Res Publica in approximately equal               
numbers. These results are displayed in graph 16 below, and above in table 14.  
  
 
 ​Source: author’s own data 
 
Graph 16: Votes Cast for Estonian Parties by Gender 
 
In graph 17, next page, predicted votes by age category are shown. I have               
combined the male and female results to be able to compare the trends on one graph                
(but the complete results for votes by age and gender can be found in the appendices                
starting on page 84). The results for gender described above also list which genders vote               
for each parties. Looking at the results for age only, they show that until the age of 45,                  
the Reform Party is predicted to receive the most ballots. After this, the most votes for                
each age group are predicted to be cast for the social democrats. Following migrations              
trends, people under the age of 35, who emigrate in the highest numbers, are predicted               
to cast the most ballots. All figures for votes by age group and gender for each party can                  
be found in the appendices, starting on page 91 (appendix 4 (total votes by age and                
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gender), appendix 5 (age, women, party, voted for), appendix 6 (age, men, and party              
voted for)).  
  
 
 ​Source: author’s own data 
 
Graph 17: Total Predicted Votes Cast by Each Age Group for Each Party  
 
The results in table 15, on page 64, show the results of the election when predicted                 
votes are added to the 2015 Estonian National Election results. The total turnout has              
increased to ​604,684 when emigrant votes are added. The Reform Party and Social             
Democrats make the biggest gains, which is expected as they received the most             
predicted votes. Reform increase their vote share by 0.5%, and increase to 28.2% of the               
total vote share. The Social Democrats gain 0.2%, rising from 15.2% to 15.4%. Pro              
Patria and Res Publica gain nothing, sticking with their election turnout of 13.7%. The              
Centre Party, which gained the second highest vote share in the 2015 election, lose              
0.3%. This 0.3% is a small different, but it means the Reform Party increases its lead                
over the Centre Party by 0.8% in total, and strengthening its position overall. These              
results are shown on graph 18, next page.  
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Table 15: Results of all parties in 2015 Estonian National elections with additional 
votes and turnout 
 
 ​Results: 
Estonia  
Reform 
Party 
Centre 
Party 
 
Social 
Democrats 
Pro Patria 
and Res 
Publica  
Total votes 
(all parties)  
Votes*  11,304 
 
5,493 
 
6,054 
(22.6%) 
3,923 
(14.7%) 
26,774 
 
Votes 2015 
election** 
158,971 
(27.7%) 
142,460 
(24.8%) 
87,190  
(15.2%) 
78,697 
(13.7%) 
577,910 
 
New totals* 170,275 
(28.2%) 
147,951 
(24.5%) 
 93,243  
(15.4%) 
 
       82,622 
(13.7%) 
 
604,684 
 
Difference +0.5% -0.3% +0.2% 0   
*Source: Author’s own data  / ​** Source: Estonian National Electoral Committee 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s own data  / ​Estonian National Electoral Committee 
 
Graph 18: Estonian Election Results with Probability Votes Added to Each Party’s Vote 
Share 
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Latvia  
Predicted Votes for Each Party  
The results for Latvia show that, in total, 136,500 votes are predicted to be cast for                  
the four parties studied. The Unity Coalition, who, in the 2014 election, came away with               
the second highest vote share, are predicted to gain the most votes, according to my               
calculations. They would receive 56,005 votes - more than 41% of the total votes. The               
Union of Greens and Farmers would have received the second highest amount of votes,              
40,676, or 29.78%. Following this, Harmony - who received the most votes in the actual               
2014 election - are predicted to gain a further 26,087 votes, or around 19% of the total                 
votes. National Alliance would then pick up the rest of the predicted votes. These votes               
combined total slightly more than 15% of the votes in 2014 national election.  
When we look at how each gender is predicted to vote, the results show that                
women are likely to cast almost 10,000 more votes than men. They cast more votes for                
all parties except Harmony, and the majority of those votes are cast for the Union of                
Greens and Farmers and the Unity Coalition. Men and women vote in equal numbers              
for National Alliance. The difference between men and women voting for Harmony is             
around 2,500 ballots. These results are shown below in table 16, below, and graph 19,               
on the next page.  
 
Table 16: Emigrant Votes Determined by Age and Gender for Latvian National Election 2014 
Results: 
Latvia 
Union of 
Greens and 
Farmers  
Unity 
Coalition 
Harmony  National 
Alliance 
Total 
 
Probability 
Votes 
40,676 
(29.78%) 
56,005 
(41.01%) 
26,087 
(19.10%) 
13,333 
(9.76%) 
136,550 
(+15.06%) 
Male 16,559 25,728 14,321 6,544 63,152 
Female 24,117 30,277 11,767 6,789 72,950 
Source: author’s own data 
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 ​Source: author’s own data 
 
Graph 19: Votes Cast for Latvian Parties by Gender 
 
 
 ​Source: author’s own data 
 
Graph 20: Total Predicted Votes Cast by Each Age Group for Each Latvian Party  
 
In the above graph (20), predicted votes for each party have been broken down into each                
age category. The results show that emigrants under 40 are most likely to cast a vote for                 
the Unity Coalition and that people over 45 will vote for the Union of Greens and                
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Farmers. As with Estonia, people under the age of 35 are predicted to cast the most                
votes, although as stated in the last section, the same age group are also the least likely                 
to vote in general. All figures for votes by age group and gender for each party can be                  
found in the appendices, starting on page 91 (appendix 7 (total votes by age and               
gender), appendix 8 (age, women, party, voted for), appendix 9 (age, men, and party              
voted for)).  
​Table 17, below, and graph 21, on page 68, shows the results of adding the predicted                   
votes to the 2014 election results. The new total voting turnout increases from 906,538              
to 1,038,088. When the total number of predicted votes by age and gender are added to                
the total number of votes cast in the 2014 election the Unity Coalition become the party                
with the largest vote share. It gains 2.77% extra turn out, which puts the party’s total                
vote share at 24.62% instead of 21.84%. This sees the party overtake Harmony, which is               
left on 22.73% after losing 0.24% of the vote share. Unity also increases its lead over                
the Union of Greens and Farmers who gain an additional 1.58% vote share, from              
19.51% to 21.08%. National Alliance lose 0.70% of their vote share.  
 
Table 17: Results of All Parties in 2014 Latvian National Election with Additional Votes 
and Turnout 
Results: 
Latvia  
Union of Greens 
and Farmers 
Unity 
Coalition 
Harmony  National 
Alliance  
Total 
Predicted 
Votes*  
40,676 56,005 26,087 13,333 136,550 
Votes 2014 
election** 
178,210 
(19.51%) 
199,535 
(21.84%) 
209,887 
(22.97%) 
151,567 
(16.59%) 
906,538 
 
New Total 
Votes* 
218,886 
(21.08%) 
255,540 
(24.62%) 
235,974 
(22.73%) 
164,900 
(15.88%) 
1,038,088 
Difference 
% 
+1.58% +2.77% -0.24% -0.70%  
*Source: Author’s own data  
** Source: Central Election Committee of Latvia  
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Source: Author’s own data  / ​Central Election Committee of Latvia  
 
Graph 21: Latvian Election Results with Probability Votes added to Each Party’s Vote 
Share 
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Lithuania 
 
Predicted Votes for Each Party  
The predicted votes distribution for Lithuanian parties are shown in table 18. In              
total 196,044 ballots would have been cast for the four parties, in the second round of                
voting for the 2016 national election. The Farmers and Greens Union have been             
predicted to receive the highest vote share of the predicted votes at 34.92% or 68,466               
votes. The Social Democratic Party would have received the second highest vote share             
with 27.36% , followed by Homeland Union and then the Liberal Movement. The total              
number of votes is equal to 22.25% of the total turnout for the second round of voting in                  
the 2016 national election.  
 
Table 18: Predicted Gender and Age Emigrant Votes for the Lithuanian National Election 2016  
Results: 
Lithuania 
Homeland 
Union 
(HU-LCD) 
Farmers and 
Greens Union  
 
Social 
Democratic 
Party  
Liberal 
Movement  
 
Total 
 
Probability 
Votes 
43,693 
(22.29%) 
68,466 
(34.92%) 
53,638 
(27.36%) 
30,247 
(15.43%) 
196,044 
(22.25%) 
Male 23,140 33,885 29,917 14,627 101,569 
Female 20,553 34,581 23,721 15,620 94,475 
  ​Source: author’s own data 
 
Regarding gender, men cast more votes than women, with a gap of around 6,000               
ballots between the two. Men voted in higher numbers for Homeland Union and the              
Social Democratic Party. Combined, for these two parties, men cast around 9,000 more             
votes than women did. In contrast, women were predicted to vote in higher numbers for               
the Farmers and Greens Union and Liberal Movement, but by no more than a 1,000 for                
each party. These results are also shown below in graph 22, on the next page. This                
shows there is a gender gap in how men and women vote in Lithuania.  
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  ​Source: author’s own data 
Graph 22: Votes Cast for All Lithuanian Parties by Gender  
 
 
  ​Source: author’s own data 
 
Graph 23: Total Predicted Votes Cast by Each Age Group for Each Party  
 
When these results are broken down into age categories (graph 23), they show that               
every age group casts the most votes for the Farmers and Greens Union, and then for                
every age group over 25, the Social Democratic Movement gains the second highest             
vote share of predicted votes. The Liberal Movement is the third most popular party for               
 
 
70 
 
 
 
the under 30s, but then declines rapidly there after. The most votes cast by the under                
35s, just like in Latvia and Estonia, even though these groups have the lowest turnout.               
All figures for votes by age group and gender for each party can be found in the                 
appendices, starting on page 91 (appendix 10 (total votes by age and gender), appendix              
11 (age, women, party, voted for), appendix 12 (age, men, and party voted for)).  
 
Below in table 18, the predicted votes have been added to the 2016 election ballots,                 
giving as new total turnout of 1,076,901. While, overall, the new results give the same               
outcome as the actual election, with the Greens and Farmers winning by far the most               
votes and the Liberal Movement gaining the least, they also show that two parties make               
huge gains. The Social Democratic Party would have increased their vote share by             
44.98%, jumping from 115,599 votes to 169,337. But, the Liberal Movement exceed            
that, and increase their share by 50.51% - increasing their votes from 30,247 to 70,005.               
These results are shown on graph 24, on the next page. These two parties would have                
been strengthened had emigrants not emigrated. As well as this, Homeland Union is the              
party which loses the highest vote share at 1.03%, despite gaining almost 44,000             
predicted votes. The Farmers and Greens Union see a slightly reduced vote share, as              
they lose 0.009%. In contrast, the Social Democratic Party gain 2.60% of the total vote               
share and the Liberal Movement 1.36%.  
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Table 19: Results of all parties in 2016 Lithuanian Election with Additional Votes and 
Turnout 
Results: 
Lithuania 
 
Homeland 
Union 
(HU-LCD) 
Farmers 
and Greens 
Union 
Social 
Democratic 
Party 
Liberal 
Movement  
 
Total 
 
Predicted  
Votes*  43,693 68,466 53,638 30,247 196,044 
Votes 2016 
election** 
246,108 
(27.94%) 
311,611 
(35.38%) 
115,599 
(13.12%) 
70,055 
(7.95%) 
880,857 
 
New Total 
Votes* 
289,801 
(26.91%) 
380,077 
(35.29%)  
169,337 
(15.72%) 
100,302 
(9.31) 
1,076,901 
Difference 
% 
-1.03% -0.09% +2.60% +1.36%   
*Source: Author’s own data  
** Source: Central Electoral Commission of the Republic of Lithuania 
 
 
 
 
 
Graph 24: Lithuanian Election Results with Probability Votes Added to Each Party’s 
Vote Share 
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Summary  
 
In summary, my results show that if emigrants had stayed in their home countries               
and voted, that the most popular party in Latvia would have changed from Harmony to               
the Unity Coalition, but the allocation of votes would have remained the same in              
Estonia and Lithuania. In Latvia, the result would ultimately have remained the same             
too because after the election in 2012 a coalition was formed between parties to keep               
Harmony Centre out of the government. But because Latvia has a proportional electoral             
system, they could have won more seats than they did if emigrants had remained in               
Latvia and voted. My results also show that in Lithuania, the Social Democratic Party              
and Liberal Movement would have increased their vote share if emigrants had voted,             
weakening both the Greens and Peasants and Homeland Union. In Estonia, there were             
no significant changes in the election outcome by adding votes from emigrants to the              
election outcome of 2015, but the Reform Party would have increases its lead over the               
Centre Party.  
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CHAPTER SIX 
  
DISCUSSION  
 
In this section I will discuss my results, answer my two research questions, and layout               
ideas for further research in this subject area. After that, there will be a conclusion               
which will be the last chapter of this thesis.  
 
How have voting demographics changed in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania since 
2004? 
From the demographic data collected by national statistics agencies we can see that              
voting demographics have changed in each country primarily because young people           
have emigrated in the largest numbers since 2014. This means that there are fewer, by               
hundreds of thousands, of young people in each country to cast votes in each election as                
migration is highest among the under 40s.  
Regarding gender, in Estonia thousands more women have migrated than men, so             
there are fewer women than there should be given the demographics. However, the             
Estonian population as a whole has more women than men, so emigration may have              
evened out this imbalance. In Latvia and Lithuania, men and women have emigrated in              
equal numbers. But Latvian women were shown by my results to vote at a higher rate                
than men.  
Another way in which the voting demographic has changed in regards to young              
people voting, is that in Latvia and Lithuania, young people with higher educated have              
left both countries causing a brain drain. This changes the voting demographics because             
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there is a strong correlation between higher education and voting. Most of these young              
migrants are also documented as being single, rather than married.  
Emigration may end up being a long term problem when it comes to voting               
because if a person migrates in their early 20s and stays abroad for several years, or                
maybe even decades, this may also lead to a decrease in voting even when this               
generation, or cohort, are older, as they are not in the habit of doing so or are                 
disinterested in the politics of their home country. There is plenty of research to show               
that voting is based on habit and if a voter starts voting when they are younger, they are                  
more likely to carry on in following elections.  
Potentially, this change in demographics is a concern if each country still sees              
bringing young people from abroad back to their home countries as the solution to              
population decline, because Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania all have aging populations           
which gives older people a greater say at the ballot box because there are more of them.                 
Older people are also much more likely to vote and therefore parties could create              
policies targeted specifically at older voters and not young people.  
 
What political forces have been strengthened as a result of outward migration?  
My results show that parties in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania have been             
strengthened and weakened, but to different levels in each country. The strongest results             
were found in Latvia, and then Lithuania. A smaller impact was seen in Estonia.  
In ​Latvia​, my calculations show that a different party would have likely gained the               
largest vote share had emigrants not left, and stayed at home, and voted. Harmony,              
which gained the largest amount of ballots in the 2014 election fell to second place after                
the Unity Coalition (UC) gained more predicted votes. In a proportional system this             
would have given the Unity Coalition more seats and strengthened them as a party over               
their rivals. This could have made a difference in the formation of the coalition              
government as the UC would have had a lot more seats than the Union of Greens and                 
Farmers (UGF), who were their closest rival in 2014. In the actual election UC won 23                
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seats, UGF 21, and Harmony 31. However, if Unity had been the biggest party they               
would have gained significantly more seats which would have given them more power             
in the coalition formation negotiations and when they were in government. With regards             
to Harmony, during the coalition formation talks which took place after the 2014             
election, the parties banded together to keep Harmony out of the government and force              
them into the role of the opposition. So it’s fair to say Harmony’s position would still be                 
in opposition, but they would have less seats. This shows Harmony would have been              
weakened as a party.  
 
For ​Lithuania​, although several parties gained more votes and were strengthened            
by this, the outcome of the 2016 election would have given the same results in regards                
to which parties gained the most votes. However, the Social Democratic and Liberal             
Party would have gained a lot more votes than they did in real life, and these would                 
have mostly come from young people. This would have weakened the Greens and             
Peasants and Homeland Union parties, but the Greens and Peasants would still have             
collected the most ballots in the election.  
 
Finally, regarding ​Estonia​, my calculations show that high migration has less of an              
effect on the outcome of the 2015 election than it did on the other two countries’                
elections. The predicted votes were distributed in the same way as they were in the               
actual election. This is probably because young people are very likely to vote for              
Reform, who gained the most votes during the election, and young people have left              
Estonian in the largest numbers. However, while the gains the Reform Party made from              
the predicted votes proved to be only a small increase in vote share, because the Centre                
Party lost a small amount of its vote share, this saw the gap between the two parties                 
increase.  
 
Looking at the ideological beliefs behind these parties, in Estonia and Latvia the              
majority of votes were cast for the centre-right parties Reform and Unity (and Union of               
Greens and Farmers), so my results show that the centre-right has been strengthened in              
these countries at the expense of Harmony and Centre, who are more on to the left of                 
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the political spectrum. In Lithuania, the results when discussed on this basis are not so               
clear. While most votes are cast for the centre-right parties Farmers and Greens Union              
and Homeland Union-Lithuanian Christian Democrats, their overall vote share         
decreases and the centre-left Social Democratic party receives more than 50% of the             
votes than it did in the 2016 election. Which shows that the centre-left political force               
has been strengthened. However, the Liberal Movement, which also almost doubles its            
total votes when the predicted votes were added, is perceived to be more to the               
centre-right. But seeing as the Social Democratic Party increased its total vote share by              
2.60%, and the losses of Homeland Union-Lithuanian Christian Democrats (1.03%) and           
the Union of Greens and Farmers (0.09%) are subtracted from the Liberal Movement’s             
1.36% vote share increased, that leaves an increase for the centre-right parties of 0.22%.              
Therefore, in Lithuania, it may well be fair to say the centre-left if the political force                
which would have been strengthened if emigrants had not emigrated.  
 
It is also important to remember that the emigration data from each country is              
incomplete, as mentioned in the limitations section. Emigration data totals, especially           
from sending countries, are regarded to be lower than they actually are, as people are               
not required to notify the government when they leave. If data had been more accurately               
gathered, it would have been possible to estimate a more accurate answer. This would              
also be possible to do if each country was looked at as a single case study, as more data                   
is available and more variables could have been added to the models.  
 
Further Research 
 
 
If further research was to be carried out on this subject in the Baltic states, now                 
that initial results have been carried out to see if, and which, countries’ election              
outcomes are most affected by high rates of emigration, each country should be studied              
on it’s own. Two of the studies that I read for this thesis focused on Moldova and Italy                  
and broke the country down into regions, where local elections and migration of people,              
both internal and external, were studied for several election cycles. This is how I would               
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suggest proceeding with this area of study, and Latvia, particularly, seems to be a good               
candidate for this type of research. This are for two reasons for this:  
 
 
1. The results I calculated were strongest in Latvia  
2. Voters do not submit ballots to their previous places of residence  
 
If a Latvian votes from abroad, their vote is submitted to the Riga municipality,               
regardless of whether they have ever lived or worked in the capital city. This, surely,               
discourages voters who live in other areas from casting their ballots as it breaks              
connects with an area they know well and may have an interested in, such as a home                 
municipality. However, qualitative interviews should also be carried to understand why           
Latvians living abroad do not vote to stand alongside the quantitative research. This             
could also be undertaken for the other two countries, and especially for Estonians who              
have the simplest and easiest way of voting from another county, but don’t. Secondly, it               
would beneficial to see if research could be carried out which could determine whether              
or not traditional indicators of voting, such as education level and marital status, do              
have an effect on emigrants voting in home country elections, or their intentions to do               
so. Thirdly, research that seeks to understand how emigrants interact with their            
destination country’s political system in contrast with their home country political           
system when they live abroad would also shine new light on this subject.  
 
It would be interesting to carry out research in European Union countries outside               
of the Baltic states which have also had high levels of emigration and internal              
migration, such as Poland and Hungary, which have seen their politics undergo more             
radical changes. More research should be carried out to see if emigration is a driving               
force behind votes for parties in these countries, and especially to see if it has affected                
the composition of voters in urban and rural areas. This is what Anelli and Peri focused                
on in their research paper about the Five Star Movement in Italy. Hungary also joined               
the European Union in 2004 and has seen high migration over the past decade,              
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especially since the financial crisis. As a final recommendation, more research should            
be carried out into whether freedom of movement has contributed to political stability or              
instability within the European Union.  
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CHAPTER SEVEN  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This thesis sought to understand how, and if, large-scale migration from Estonia,             
Latvia, and Lithuania after the three countries joined the European Union in 2004 has              
had an effect on the outcomes of three national elections held in 2014, 2015, and 2016.                
Since accession in 2004, the lifting of labour market restrictions in 2007, and the fallout               
of the financial crisis in 2008, hundreds of thousands of mostly young people have              
moved abroad, either temporarily or permanently, to live and work in other EU member              
states. This has rapidly decreased the sizes of their home country populations and work              
forces by up to 15%, leading to a “demographic crisis”, (LTV/LSM, 2017) exacerbating             
declining birth rates and aging populations. Governments see the best way of fixing             
these crisis is by encouraging the emigrants to come back home.  
While emigrants live abroad they mostly stop voting in elections in their country of               
origin, which has led to a non-random section of each country’s population withdrawing             
from making decisions about the future of their country. This leaves the future of the               
country in the hands of people who have not left, and this could potentially push policy                
makers into making decisions that may be totally out of step with the people who have                
emigrated. This could decrease the likelihood of attracting emigrants back home in the             
future.  
With this in mind, I wanted to find out if emigrants not voting in elections had                 
changed their outcomes. While there is plenty of literature written on the subject of how               
large-scale immigration to a country changes the political atmosphere and how host            
country voters react to this at the polls, there has been very little research carried out on                 
how emigration affects a sending country’s elections. There has also been little research             
carried out about the motivations of emigrants to politically engage with their home             
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countries while they live abroad, which includes deciding whether or not to vote in an               
election. Researchers are not even sure whether classical indicators associated with a            
person in their home country voting in local and nation elections apply to emigrants at               
all. There is some evidence that emigration has influenced elections in Italy, Moldova,             
and Mexico, and that voting turnout of countries that joined the EU after 2004 has been                
suppressed by emigration.  
In order to carry out my research I created an impact assessment and used a                
counterfactual model to estimate what the impact could have been on elections had             
emigrants not left and voted in elections. I used migration data from each country’s              
statistics agencies to gain a total figure of how many men and women had left between                
2004 and the year before, or of, the election selected for examination. This data also               
gave me their ages, but hindered my original plans to use ethnicity, education level, and               
marital status data as it was not freely accessible in a comparable form across all three                
countries. To create my counterfactual model, I made profiles of the emigrants based             
on European Social Survey data collected from people who still live in Estonia, Latvia,              
and Lithuania and voted in recent elections. I assumed that the emigrants would behave              
in the same way and vote for the same political parties if they had not migrated, based                 
on these profiles.  
My results of my calculations showed that, potentially, turnout would have            
increased by 4.63% in Estonia, 14.29% in Latvia, and 21.50% in Lithuania. In Latvia,              
the increase of votes would have meant the Unity Coalition gained the most ballots,              
pushing Harmony - who actually were awarded the most votes in the 2014 election -               
into second place. This would have given the Unity Coalition a bigger share of the seats                
in the subsequent coalition government that was formed, which excluded Harmony. In            
Estonia, the vote share distribution between the four largest parties would have            
remained unchanged, with the Reform Party gaining the majority of predicted votes and.             
The results show that Reform and the Social Democrats would have strengthened their             
vote share slightly, while the Centre Party’s declined slightly. But none of these             
increases or decreases would have been significant overall or changed the outcome of             
the election, although it may have given Reform several more seats. Lastly, for             
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Lithuania the results show the country has the highest rate of predicted ballots cast, but               
this was still the lowest of all three countries when compared to its emigration rate.               
Similarly, to Estonia, these votes shows that the outcome of the election would have              
remained the same but would have strengthened the Social Democratic Party and            
Liberal Party who would have both gained a lot more votes than they did in real life. It                  
would have led to the strengthening of centre-right parties in Estonia and Latvia, but in               
Lithuania the centre-right would have weakened, while the centre-left was strengthened.  
This thesis has filled a gap in the literature because it is the first piece of research,                  
as far as I know, that has tried to estimate the impact of high-level emigration on                
election outcomes in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania after they joined the European            
Union. It also contributes to the small amount of literature already written on the subject               
of the impact of emigration on elections.  
In conclusion, high-levels of emigration can have an impact on a country’s election              
outcome, and in the case of the Baltic states Latvia’s election result could have been               
significantly different from the actual result obtained in 2014. However, election results            
were not found to be different for Estonia and Lithuania.  
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APPENDICES  
 
Appendix 1: Probability of Voting for Each Party by Age Group and Gender in Estonia  
 
Gender Age Reform Centre  
Pro Patria Res 
Publica 
Social 
Democrats 
f 20-24 0.4850285 0.1303955 0.1354301 0.2491459 
m  0.4592619 0.1616756 0.1762478 0.2028146 
f 25-29 0.4659314 0.1461787 0.1335682 0.2543217 
m  0.4397383 0.180653 0.173257 0.2063517 
f 30-34 0.4481441 0.1635367 0.1318363 0.2564829 
m  0.421194 0.2012651 0.1703001 0.2072407 
f 35-39 0.4316006 0.1825931 0.1302383 0.255568 
m  0.4035868 0.2235775 0.1673821 0.2054536 
f 40-44 0.4161884 0.2034538 0.1287624 0.2515954 
m  0.3868382 0.2476247 0.1644916 0.2010455 
f 45-49 0.4017583 0.2261952 0.1273823 0.2446642 
m  0.370843 0.2733992 0.1616031 0.1941547 
f 50-54 0.3881353 0.2508495 0.1260596 0.2349556 
m  0.3554805 0.3008393 0.1586806 0.1849996 
f 55-59 0.3751297 0.2773908 0.1247457 0.2227337 
m  0.3406254 0.3298196 0.1556813 0.1738737 
f 60-64 0.3625493 0.3057224 0.1233859 0.2083424 
m  0.3261585 0.3601452 0.1525607 0.1611357 
f 65-69 0.350211 0.3356669 0.1219231 0.192199 
m  0.3119761 0.3915514 0.1492769 0.1471956 
f 70-74 0.3379534 0.3669637 0.1203022 0.1747807 
m  0.2979982 0.4237099 0.145796 0.1324959 
f 75-79 0.3256473 0.3992732 0.1184752 0.1566043 
m  0.2841741 0.4562428 0.1420953 0.1174878 
f 80-84 0.3132039 0.4321907 0.1164056 0.1381998 
m  0.2704846 0.4887419 0.138167 0.1026066 
 
Source: Author’s own data 
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Appendix 2: Probability of Voting for Each Party by Age Group and Gender in Latvia 
 
Gender Age  
Union of Greens 
and Farmers 
Unity 
Coalition Harmony 
National 
Alliance  
f 20-24 0.2719624 0.5051133 0.1869452 0.0359791 
m  0.1898218 0.5481551 0.2268062 0.0352169 
f 25-29 0.3106884 0.4360418 0.1992773 0.0539926 
m  0.2202284 0.4805671 0.2455328 0.0536717 
f 30-34 0.3433531 0.3784947 0.2025344 0.0756178 
m  0.2470285 0.4233927 0.2532842 0.0762946 
f 35-39 0.3698379 0.3328424 0.1977389 0.0995808 
m  0.2698155 0.3775474 0.2507557 0.1018813 
f 40-44 0.3907885 0.2984487 0.1866564 0.1241064 
m  0.2887645 0.3428856 0.2397443 0.1286056 
f 45-49 0.4072411 0.2743297 0.171266 0.1471632 
m  0.3044005 0.3188189 0.2225196 0.1542611 
f 50-54 0.4203022 0.2595786 0.1533902 0.1667291 
m  0.3173675 0.3047524 0.2013268 0.1765532 
f 55-59 0.430886 0.2535994 0.1344969 0.1810177 
m  0.3282132 0.3003442 0.1780776 0.1933651 
f 60-64 0.4394979 0.2562203 0.1156428 0.188639 
m  0.3371867 0.3056361 0.1542182 0.2029591 
f 65-69 0.4460501 0.2677344 0.0975114 0.1887041 
m  0.3440536 0.3210879 0.1307377 0.2041207 
f 70-74 0.4497116 0.2888755 0.0805032 0.1809096 
m  0.3479413 0.3475042 0.1082651 0.1962894 
f 75-79 0.4488244 0.3207021 0.0648427 0.1656308 
m  0.3472686 0.3858053 0.0872074 0.1797187 
f 80-84 0.44098 0.3643221 0.0506765 0.1440215 
m  0.3398716 0.436575 0.06789 0.1556634 
 
Source: Author’s own data 
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Appendix 3: Probability of Voting for Each Party by Age Group and Gender in 
Lithuania 
 
Gender Age 
Homeland 
Union 
(HU-LCD) 
Farmers 
and Greens 
Union  
Social 
Democratic 
Party  
Liberal 
Movement  
 
f 20-24 0.1681319 0.3104706 0.2223979 0.2989995 
m  0.1858805 0.3063903 0.2717909 0.2359383 
f 25-29 0.186125 0.3301526 0.236097 0.2476254 
m  0.2026285 0.3208348 0.2841232 0.1924134 
f 30-34 0.2032613 0.3464737 0.2473576 0.2029074 
m  0.2183755 0.3322694 0.2937616 0.1555935 
f 35-39 0.2194007 0.3595215 0.2562554 0.1648224 
m  0.2331009 0.3409584 0.3009533 0.1249874 
f 40-44 0.2345026 0.3695483 0.2629823 0.1329667 
m  0.2468506 0.3472391 0.3060084 0.0999019 
f 45-49 0.2485989 0.3768993 0.2677944 0.1067073 
m  0.2597113 0.3514696 0.3092527 0.0795664 
f 50-54 0.2617677 0.3819535 0.2709702 0.0853086 
m  0.2717885 0.3539943 0.3109975 0.0632197 
f 55-59 0.2741109 0.3850832 0.2727811 0.0680248 
m  0.2831921 0.3551243 0.3115226 0.050161 
f 60-64 0.2857378 0.3866301 0.2734751 0.0541571 
m  0.2940266 0.3551284 0.3110693 0.0397757 
f 65-69 0.2967547 0.3868931 0.2732685 0.0430838 
m  0.3043859 0.3542328 0.3098396 0.0315417 
f 70-74 0.3072589 0.3861258 0.2723439 0.0342714 
m  0.3143517 0.3526234 0.3079991 0.0250258 
f 75-79 0.3173355 0.3845386 0.2708525 0.0272734 
m  0.3239926 0.3504509 0.3056819 0.0198747 
f 80-84 0.3270572 0.3823027 0.2689171 0.021723 
m  0.3333652 0.3478362 0.3029949 0.0158038 
 
Source: Author’s own data 
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Appendix 4: Predicted Votes Cast by Each Age Group by Men and Women for Each 
Estonian Political Party  
 
Age 
Reform 
Party 
Centre  
Party 
Pro Patria Res 
Publica 
Social 
Democrats 
20-24 1746 525 559 1084 
25-29 2384 842 788 1630 
30-34 1862 774 641 1415 
35-39 1489 722 529 1251 
40-44 1300 726 472 1198 
45-49 1031 654 377 1031 
50-54 744 535 274 809 
55-59 392 320 147 467 
60-64 135 126 51 177 
65-69 79 81 30 111 
70-74 53 62 21 83 
75-79 47 61 19 80 
80-84 27 38 10 48 
85-89 15 24 6 30 
 
Source: Author’s own data 
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Appendix 5: Predicted Votes Cast by Women for Each Age Group for Each Estonian 
Political Party  
 
Age 
Reform  
Party 
Centre 
 Party 
Pro Patria 
Res Publica 
Social  
Democrats 
20-24 1066 286 298 547 
25-29 1410 442 404 770 
30-34 1019 371 300 583 
35-39 779 329 235 461 
40-44 701 343 217 424 
45-49 606 341 192 369 
50-54 477 309 155 290 
55-59 263 195 88 156 
60-64 89 75 30 51 
65-69 63 61 22 35 
70-74 39 43 14 20 
75-79 37 46 14 18 
80-84 22 30 8 10 
85-89 12 19 5 5 
 
Source: Author’s own data 
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Appendix 6: Predicted Votes Cast by Men  for Each Age Group for Each Estonian 
Political Party  
 
Age 
Reform  
Party 
Centre 
 Party 
Pro Patria 
Res Publica 
Social  
Democrats 
20-24 680 239 261 300 
25-29 974 400 384 457 
30-34 843 403 341 415 
35-39 710 393 294 361 
40-44 599 383 255 311 
45-49 425 313 185 223 
50-54 267 226 119 139 
55-59 129 125 59 66 
60-64 46 51 21 23 
65-69 16 20 8 7 
70-74 14 19 7 6 
75-79 10 15 5 4 
80-84 5 8 2 2 
85-89 3 5 1 1 
 
Source: Author’s own data 
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Appendix 7: Predicted Votes Cast by Each Age Group by Men and Women for Each 
Latvian Political Party  
 
Age 
Union of 
Greens and 
Farmers 
Unity 
Coalition Harmony 
National 
Alliance 
20-24 4976 11118 4345 755 
25-29 6239 10672 2743 1256 
30-34 5297 7236 4119 1369 
35-39 4717 5336 3385 1507 
40-44 4440 4242 2831 1667 
45-49 4236 3546 2357 1800 
50-54 3661 2765 1737 1687 
55-59 2603 1861 1045 1264 
60-64 1312 930 444 651 
65-69 987 708 272 476 
70-74 825 620 181 372 
75-79 605 502 106 250 
80-84 777 723 104 277 
 
Source: Author’s own data 
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Appendix 8: Predicted Votes Cast by Women  for Each Age Group for Each Latvian 
Political Party  
 
Age 
Union of 
Greens and 
Farmers 
Unity 
Coalition Harmony 
National  
Alliance 
20-24 3156 5861 2169 417 
25-29 3779 5304 2424 657 
30-34 3012 3321 1777 663 
35-39 2532 2279 1354 682 
40-44 2428 1854 1160 771 
45-49 2384 1606 1002 861 
50-54 2188 1351 798 868 
55-59 1595 939 498 670 
60-64 803 468 211 345 
65-69 640 384 140 271 
70-74 573 368 103 231 
75-79 428 306 62 158 
80-84 599 495 69 196 
 
Source: Author’s own data 
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Appendix 9: Predicted Votes Cast by Men  for Each Age Group for Each Latvian 
Political Party  
 
Age 
Union of 
Greens and 
Farmers 
Unity 
Coalition Harmony 
National  
Alliance 
20-24 1821 5258 2175 338 
25-29 2460 5369 2743 600 
30-34 2284 3915 2342 705 
35-39 2185 3057 2031 825 
40-44 2012 2390 1671 896 
45-49 1853 1941 1354 939 
50-54 1473 1414 934 819 
55-59 1008 923 547 594 
60-64 509 462 233 307 
65-69 347 323 132 206 
70-74 252 252 78 142 
75-79 177 197 44 92 
80-84 178 228 36 81 
 
Source: Author’s own data 
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Appendix 10: Predicted Votes Cast by Each Age Group by Men and Women for Each 
Lithuanian Political Party  
 
Age HU-LCD* 
Farmers and 
Greens Union 
Social 
Democratic 
Party 
Liberal 
Movement 
20-24 5,735 11,275 8,014 6,900 
25-29 7,277 12,1638 9,753 8,193 
30-34 6,342 10,171 8,164 5,333 
35-39 5,987 9,208 7,414 3,762 
40-44 5,427 8,035 6,449 2,580 
45-49 4,687 6,696 5,334 1,703 
50-54 3,611 4,984 3,935 1,007 
55-59 2,107 2,814 2,199 454 
60-64 975 1,258 977 162 
65-69 5583 699 533 73 
70-74 344 418 316 35 
75-79 276 325 242 221 
80-84 367 419 309 23 
 
Source: Author’s own data 
*Full name: Homeland Union-Lithuania Christian Democrats  
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Appendix 11: Predicted Votes for Each Party by Age Group for Lithuanian Women  
 
Age  HU-LCD* 
Farmers and 
Greens Union 
Social 
Democratic 
Party 
Liberal 
Movement 
20-24 2,663 6,213 3,523 3,001 
25-29 3,370 5,977 4,274 4,483 
30-34 2,853 4,863 3,472 2,848 
35-39 2,566 4,205 2,997 1,928 
40-44 2,365 3,727 2,652 1,341 
45-49 2,173 3,294 2,341 933 
50-54 1,797 2,621 1,860 585 
55-59 1,137 1,597 1,131 282 
60-64 549 743 526 104 
65-69 359 468 331 52 
70-74 235 295 208 26 
75-79 201. 244 172 17 
80-84 285 333 235 19 
Total 20,553 34,581 23,720 15,619 
 
Source: Author’s own data 
*Full name: Homeland Union-Lithuania Christian Democrats  
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Appendix 12: Predicted Votes for Each Party by Age Group for Lithuanian Men  
 
Age  HU-LCD* 
Farmers and 
Greens Union 
Social 
Democratic 
Party 
Liberal 
Movement 
20-24 3,071 5,063 4,491 3,899 
25-29 3,907 6,186 5,478 3,710 
30-34 3,488 5,308 4,693 2,486 
35-39 3,421 5,003 4,416 1,834 
40-44 3,063 4,308 3,797 1,239 
45-49 2,514 3,402 2,993 770 
50-54 1,814 2,361 2,076 422 
55-59 970 1,217 1,067 172 
60-64 426 515 451 58 
65-69 199 231 202 21 
70-74 110 123 107 8. 
75-79 75 81 70 5 
80-84 82 85 74 4 
Total 23,140 33,885 29,917 14,627 
 
Source: Author’s own data 
*Full name: Homeland Union-Lithuania Christian Democrats  
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